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EDITOR’S NOTE

T

he observant reader will already have noted that this is a double issue,
constituting Issues 3 and 4 of Volume 40. It reflects, I’m afraid, one of
the regrets of my tenure as your editor—I simply haven’t been able to
keep our publication on schedule. It is helpful, I think, to have a full-time
judge serve as editor. Issues that arise in my daily work suggest a need for
informative articles that I can solicit and the knowledge I get in my daily work
helps me in determining which articles to select and how to edit them. But
there’s always the time commitment required by my day job as well.
With this double issue—and coming issues on jury reform and judicial independence in the trial court—we will be back on schedule by the time of the
American Judges Association’s annual conference in October in San Francisco.
I have appreciated your patience as our publication schedule has lagged behind the calendar;
I have also appreciated the many kind comments we’ve received regarding the quality of
the articles you have received.
The first article in this issue was inspired by
the anniversary of the Brown v. Board of
Education decision. Hongxia Liu takes us on a
tour of the sculpted friezes in the United States
Supreme Court Building, noting the diversity of
the 18 lawgivers depicted there. Aside from our
cover photos, we don’t normally pay much
attention here to the buildings from which justice is dispensed. Liu ties together quite nicely
the concepts of diversity that have come in decisions from the Court and the
edifice from which they are crafted.
Two articles dealing with the criminal justice system follow. Jennifer Skeem
and John Petrila review the increasing use of specialty probation dockets for
offenders with mental illness. They note both problems and opportunities created by such dockets. Judge Michael Marcus of Oregon discusses his proposals for smarter sentencing—focusing on crime reduction as a primary goal.
In our next article, Elizabeth Neeley reviews the concerns of minority residents of Nebraska about their court system. These concerns were explored in
extensive public hearings in 2002. Neeley reviews both the methods that can
be used to explore such issues and the concerns that were expressed.
Our last article, by Gene Flango and Ann Keith of the National Center for
State Courts, assesses the use being made of new laws in several states to curb
aggressive driving. Surveys of judges, attorneys, and law enforcement officers
in Virginia showed unexpectedly low interest in using these new statutes.
As always, we invite you to take a look at the Resource Page at the end of
the issue. This issue covers resources for complying with the U.S. Supreme
Court’s new sentencing decision, Blakely v. Washington; background resources
on the Brown v. Board of Education case; and the latest information on proposed
changes to the Model Code of Judicial Conduct.—SL
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working judges of the United States, Canada, and Mexico.
In each issue, we hope to provide information that will be
of use to judges in their everyday work, whether in highlighting new procedures or methods of trial, court, or
case management, providing substantive information
regarding an area of law likely to encountered by many
judges, or by providing background information (such as
psychology or other social science research) that can be
used by judges in their work. Guidelines for the submission of manuscripts for Court Review are set forth on page
26 of the Summer 2003 issue. Court Review reserves the
right to edit, condense, or reject material submitted for
publication.
Court Review is in full text on LEXIS and is indexed in the
Current Law Index, the Legal Resource Index, and
LegalTrac.
Letters to the Editor, intended for publication, are welcome. Please send such letters to Court Review’s editor:
Judge Steve Leben, 100 North Kansas Avenue, Olathe,
Kansas 66061, e-mail address: sleben@ix.netcom.com.
Comments and suggestions for the publication, not
intended for publication, also are welcome.
Advertising: Court Review accepts advertising for products and services of interest to judges. For information,
contact Deloris Gager at (757) 259-1864.
Photo credit: Mary S. Watkins (maryswatkinsphoto
@earthlink.net). The cover photo is of the Pitken County
Courthouse, in Aspen, Colorado.
© 2004, American Judges Association, printed in the
United States. Court Review is published quarterly by the
American Judges Association (AJA). AJA members
receive a subscription to Court Review. Non-member subscriptions are available for $35 per volume (four issues
per volume). Subscriptions are terminable at the end of
any volume upon notice given to the publisher. Prices are
subject to change without notice. Second-class postage
paid at Williamsburg, Virginia, and additional mailing
offices. Address all correspondence about subscriptions,
undeliverable copies, and change of address to
Association Services, National Center for State Courts,
Williamsburg, Virginia 23185-4147. Points of view or
opinions expressed in Court Review are those of the
authors and do not necessarily represent the positions of
the National Center for State Courts or the American
Judges Association. ISSN: 0011-0647.

President’s Column
Michael R. McAdam

I have just returned from the annual meeting of the Canadian

The 5,500-mile trip was also unforgettable for another rea-

Association of Provincial Court Judges (CAPCJ) in Whitehorse,

son: the weather. Whitehorse is the territorial capital of the

Yukon Territory. I must first tell you what a wonderful group of

Yukon and is located at approximately the same latitude as

judges I met in Canada. I made many new friends and was

Anchorage, Alaska. As you would expect for such a northern

treated as an old friend. I later realized that this treatment was

town, the average temperature for Whitehorse in late June is in

not due to my overwhelming personality but to the fact that the

the mid-60’s. Unfortunately the entire Yukon was sweltering

AJA is respected by Canadian judges and has a great reputation

from record heat that pushed temperatures into the mid-90’s

in Canada. Thus the AJA president is treated as a friend.

every day. And the days are long in Whitehorse in late June: the

The Canadian judges were also very curious about the judi-

sun doesn’t set until 11 p.m. and is up again at 4 a.m., leaving

ciary in the United States. Being the only American judge at the

little time for cooling. Of course, being familiar with Kansas

conference, I was peppered with many excellent questions

City summers, I felt right at home. One problem, however, was

about our court system. For example: How are American judges

that I packed for the crisp, bracing chill of the great North.

selected and retained? How are salaries determined

Bulky sweaters and long-sleeved shirts filled my lug-

and who pays you? What is your court’s jurisdiction?

gage. I was saved by my AJA Hawaiian shirt, which

Are your courts independent of legislative control?

was to be worn only on travel days. Instead it

These questions confirmed to me the value of hav-

became the workhorse of my Yukon wardrobe and

ing Canadian judges in the AJA. Their interests are

much admired by my Canadian counterparts. Extra

very similar to those of us who live in the United

special thanks go to Judge Dave Orr, who antici-

States. In fact, I was asked similar questions when I

pated my comfort needs and reserved an air-condi-

traveled to the National College of Probate Judges

tioned room in a very modest hotel (laundromat

conference in South Carolina last year. These are uni-

conveniently located in the lobby) a few blocks from

versal concerns to all judges, even though our courts may oper-

the elegant, yet inferno-like, conference hotel.

ate with vastly different traditions, laws, procedures, and juris-

On my way to and from Whitehorse I visited Vancouver, site

diction. It is reassuring to know that we ask the same questions

of our planned joint annual conference with CAPCJ in 2007. It

as our Canadian sisters and brothers and are troubled by the

is a spectacular, beautiful city with jagged 10,000-foot moun-

same problems that impact the judiciary, no matter the country.

tains rising up behind the glittering downtown, which seem-

This is another advantage of a national judges organization: the

ingly has a wonderful ethnic restaurant on every corner. This

exposure to the many different approaches other courts have to

means we’ll have to devise an equally glittering educational pro-

the similar issues we face. As I’ve asserted many times, going to

gram if we are to have any hope of keeping judges indoors. I

a judicial conference is a learning experience at the formal edu-

look forward to sharing that challenge with our Canadian col-

cation sessions and the evening receptions as well.

leagues.

It was a great conference and special thanks go to Judge

One final note: Mary McQueen, who has served as

Robert Hyslop of Newfoundland and Labrador, then CAPCJ

Washington’s state court administrator, has been selected to suc-

president, and Judge Heino Lilles of Whitehorse, our host and

ceed Roger Warren as president of the National Center for State

the new CAPCJ president, for their warm hospitality. Also, the

Courts. She is a dynamic leader and an energetic spokesperson

three AJA members and governors from Canada who looked

for our courts and will ably fill the big shoes of Judge Warren. I

after me in Whitehorse—Judge Irwin Lampert of New

expressed to her the AJA’s desire to continue our strong rela-

Brunswick, Judge David Orr of Saskatchewan, and Judge

tionship with the National Center and she assured me that she

Morton Minc of Quebec—deserve thanks. Each of them helped

shares the same goal. The AJA looks forward to working with

make my visit memorable.

her in the years to come.
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Court Gazing:
Features of Diversity in the U.S. Supreme Court Building
Hongxia Liu

D

“

iversity is its strength, just as it is the strength of
America itself,” wrote Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
about the United States Supreme Court.1 The
Court’s strength of diversity is manifested in various ways. To
its thousands of visitors, the Supreme Court Building itself is
perhaps the first and foremost exhibition of that strength of
diversity.
In the nation’s highest court, high above the bench, are the
figures of 18 historical lawgivers depicted
in marble friezes. These 18 lawgivers are
of different races and ethnicities, from
Hammurabi to Moses to Confucius to
John Marshall. They stand parallel, representing diverse legal traditions and heritages from around the world that have
directly or indirectly shaped the concepts
of law and justice in America.
From this building, so embodied with
the ideal of diversity, the Court has issued
a series of historical decisions, including
Brown vs. Board of Education, transforming our nation in the last three quarters of
a century into one that now finds strength
in its racial and ethnic diversity. Buildings
are human creations. Once created, they
in turn become inspiration for human
causes. This is especially true for such historical courthouses as the Supreme Court
Building.
THE CREATION OF THE SUPREME COURT BUILDING
AND ITS EMBODIMENT OF DIVERSITY

The Supreme Court Building, a classical Corinthian structure completed in 1935, is a masterpiece of architecture, majestic in size and rich in ornamentation. It serves as both home to
the Court and as a metaphor for its power and legitimacy as an
equal, independent branch of the federal government. Just as
the Court stands as a guardian of the Constitution and the Bill
of Rights, the Supreme Court Building symbolizes the notions
of justice and the rule of law that have been popularized in our
sacred documents. The gigantic columns, grand staircases, spacious corridors, and splendid artistic embellishments all
become very powerful visual embodiments of justice. The
artistic embellishments in particular, laden with values and
ideals, have proven to be a real treat for those who wish to

Footnotes
1. SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 7 (2003).
2. Office of the Curator, Supreme Court of the United States,
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admire in them the incarnation of our ideas about justice.
The 18 historical lawgivers catch our sight as soon as we
step into the Court Chamber, which measures a grandiose 82
by 91 feet and rises 44 feet to a coffered ceiling. The lawgivers
are depicted in larger-than-life size in the ivory marble friezes
on the South and North walls, each measuring 40 feet long by
7 feet 2 inches high. On the South wall are historical figures
from the pre-Christian era—Menes, Hammurabi, Moses,
Solomon, Lycurgus, Solon, Draco,
Confucius, and Octavian (Augustus). On
the North wall are historical figures of the
Christian era—Justinian, Muhammad,
Charlemagne, King John, Louis IX, Hugo
Grotius, William Blackstone, John
Marshall, and Napoleon Bonaparte.2
The effect of the friezes’ mingling of
these great lawgivers—regardless of their
differences in religion, geographic region,
historical era, political philosophy, and
race and ethnicity—is breathtaking. It
reminds us immediately that the inherent
nature of American society is open and
diverse. It illustrates our regard for the collective contribution of great lawgivers to
the development of law in the world in
general, and to the formation of the legal
system in America in particular.
Occupying nearly the highest point of the
grand and luminous courtroom, the
friezes inspire, stimulate, humble, and awe
all who enter in the chamber.
Although the figures include religious figures, Justice John
Paul Stevens has noted that the inclusion of secular figures
among them makes clear that it is a group of lawgivers, not
religious leaders:
[A] carving of Moses holding the Ten
Commandments, if that is the only adornment on a
courtroom wall, conveys an equivocal message, perhaps of respect for Judaism, for religion in general, or
for law. The addition of carvings depicting Confucius
and Muhammad may honor religion, or particular
religions, to an extent that the First Amendment does
not tolerate . . . . Placement of secular figures such as
Caesar Augustus, William Blackstone, Napoleon
Bonaparte, and John Marshall alongside these three

Information Sheet, Courtroom Friezes: North and South Walls
(2000) (available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/
north&southwalls.pdf).

religious leaders, however, signals respect not for
great proselytizers but for great lawgivers.3
The diversity of legal heritages and traditions is also visible
elsewhere in the building. The sculpted marble pediment of
the east front entrance depicts Moses, Confucius, and Solon
from three great civilizations in the East. The sculpted bronze
panel doors at the west front entrance depict historic scenes in
the development of law from the West: the trial scene from the
shield of Achilles, as described in the Iliad; a Roman praetor
publishing an edict; Julian and a pupil; Justinian publishing
the Corpus Juris; King John sealing the Magna Carta; the
Chancellor publishing the first Statute of Westminster; Lord
Coke barring King James from sitting as a judge; and Chief
Justice Marshall and Justice Story.4
The artistic depiction of diverse legal traditions and heritages embodied in the court building was mainly the product
of six years’ collective endeavor by a multidisciplinary team of
architects, artists, librarians, and politicians, as well as jurists.
The principal designers of the Supreme Court Building were
tenth Chief Justice William Howard Taft and architect Cass
Gilbert. Along with other members of the United States
Supreme Court Building Commission, they believed in artistic
freedom and allowed individual commissioned artists and
sculptors to choose the subjects and figures that would best
realize their vision of “a building of dignity and importance
suitable for its use as the permanent home of the Supreme
Court of the United States.” Gilbert was best known for having designed the Woolworth Building in New York, the world’s
tallest building at the time. He was also the designer of the
state capitols of Minnesota, West Virginia, and Arkansas.
Gilbert’s choices of sculptors for the Court Chamber, the
bronze panel doors at the West Entrance, and the pediment of
the East Entrance of the Supreme Court Building were respectively Adolph A. Weinman, John Donnelly, Jr., and Herman A.
MacNeil. Despite their different training and backgrounds,
they shared the belief that there should be a correlation
between the sculptural subject and the function of the building. They also believed that law as an element of civilization
was normally and naturally derived or inherited in this country from former civilizations. Each relied on his own contacts
and sources, however, for the selection of sculpted subjects.
The figures and symbols for the courtroom friezes were
Weinman’s own selection based upon independent research,
and his carvings bore his training in the classical and BeauxArts tradition. After receiving the commission to create the
friezes in 1932, Weinman, who lived in New York, spent con-

3. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater
Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 652-53 (1989) (Stevens, J.) (concurring and dissenting opinion).
4. SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES (2003).
5. Based upon information obtained from the Public Information
Officer, United States Supreme Court, and research conducted by
the author in the New York Public Library archives, 2003.
6. The members of the United States Supreme Court Commission at
that time were eleventh Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes,

siderable time in the New York Public Library to gather materials on the evolution of law in written history from different
civilizations. At that time, the library possessed not only extensive collections on western civilizations but also one of the best
collections on eastern civilizations, spanning from the Orient
to the Near East.
Weinman did not carry out this research alone. A researcher
at the library named Harold A. Mattice provided him able assistance by compiling a list of short written descriptions of the
major types of law and the key figures who developed them.5
Mattice was well regarded at the library for his bibliographical
knowledge about comparative literature, ranging from Latin
America to Japan and China. Based on Mattice’s initial catalog,
Weinman prepared a long list of possible lawgivers from many
cultures for consideration, but his criteria for choosing the 18
who appear are not known. In 1933, Weinman submitted his
final designs of the friezes to the United States Supreme Court
Building Commission,6 which approved them with minor
alterations. He then commenced carvings in 1934 and completed the friezes by early 1935.
The 70-year-old artworks by Weinman, Donnelly, and
MacNeil in the court building have endured over time and are
increasingly recognized and appreciated by the tens of thousands of visitors from the country and around the world. The
only public complaint came in 1997, when some Muslim
groups contended to the Court that Muhammad’s image
appearing in the courtroom was a form of sacrilege, since
graven images are forbidden in Islam.7 That controversy was
brief, however, as some of the Muslim community leaders
spoke out in favor of the artistic rendering. Dr. Taha Jaber alAlwani, chairman of the Fiqh Council of North America, published a formal legal opinion in the Journal of Law and Religion
defending Muhammad’s inclusion in the frieze:
[F]or every Muslim, the Messenger of God
(Muhammad) is the greatest and most revered personality known between the earth and heaven, not
simply one lawgiver among many. Still, it was an
important gesture by those who did not believe in
him as a Prophet and a messenger, who did not see
him as anything other than a historic personality, to
include him. In a culture whose literary heritage is
replete with disdainful images of the Prophet
Muhammad, it is comforting to note that those in the
highest Court in the United States were able to surmount these prejudices, and display his image among
those of the greatest lawgivers in human history.8

Associate Justice Willis Van Devanter, Senator Henry W. Keyes,
Senator James A. Reed, Representative Richard N. Elliot,
Representative Fritz G. Lanham, and Architect of the Capitol
David Lynn.
7. Joan Biskupic, Great Figures Gaze upon the Court, WASH. POST,
March 11, 1998 (available at http://www.dailyrepublican.com/
sup_ct_frieze.html).
8. Taha Jaber al-Alwani, Fatwa Concerning the United States Supreme
Court Courtroom Frieze, 15 J. LAW & RELIG. 1 (2000). 1
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Franz Jantzen, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States

MENES (C. 3200 B.C)
Founder of the first dynasty of ancient Egypt, Menes personified the idea of
a centralized government and is one of the earliest recorded lawgivers.
Menes in the frieze is holding the ankh, an Egyptian symbol for life.
HAMMURABI (C.1700S B.C.)
King of Babylon and founder of the Babylonian Empire, Hammurabi is known
for the Code of Hammurabi, the first surviving set of legal code covering
both civil and criminal disputes.
MOSES (C. 1300S B.C.)
The Hebrew prophet is credited with deliverance of Israelites from slavery
and receipt of the Ten Commandments. Moses in the frieze is holding two
overlapping tablets, written in Hebrew, representing the Ten
Commandments. Mosaic Law is based on the Torah, the first five books of
the Old Testament.
SOLOMON (C. 900S B.C.)
King of Israel, Solomon’s name is synonymous with “judicial wisdom.”
LYCURGUS (C. 800 B.C.)
A leading legislator and statesman of Sparta in ancient Greece, Lycurgus is
credited with being the guiding force of the reform of the Spartan constitution.

SOLON (C. 600S B.C.)
Solon, whose name has become to mean “a wise and skillful lawgiver,” was
instrumental in remodeling the Athenian constitution and in codifying and
reforming Athenian law, often revising the laws of Draco. He is credited with
laying the foundation for the world’s first democracy, although only a limited
form of democracy for wealthier citizens.
DRACO (C. 600S B.C.)
One of Solon’s predecessors in Athens, he was the first to commit an Athenian
code of laws to paper. His code included harsh penalties and death sentences
for some minor crimes. Hence, the meaning of “draconian.”
CONFUCIUS (551-479 B.C.)
A Chinese philosopher, his teachings laid a comprehensive system of ideas for
government and society based on learning, self-discipline, and virtues. At the
center of his teachings was belief in balance and harmony. He said people in
government should lead by example and emphasized a morality embodied in
the idea that a person should not do to others what he would not want done
to him. Among the aphorisms attributed to Confucius: “ I could adjudicate law
suits as well as anyone. But I would prefer to make law suits unnecessary.”
OCTAVIAN (63 B.C – 14 A.D.)
The first emperor of Rome, also called Caesar Augustus, he restored order and
modernized many aspects of Roman life. He allowed judges to exercise
authoritative roles and supported their following decisions of previous cases
to aid in determining the outcome of new disputes.

Descriptions of the contributions of each lawgiver are mainly adapted from the public information sheet published by the Office of the Curator, Supreme
Court of the United States. Figures are described from left to right.

As a result of that brief dissension, the Supreme Court
Office of the Curator revised its public information sheet about
the courtroom friezes and added the following to the introduction about the depiction of Muhammad: “The figure above
is a well-intended attempt by the sculptor, Adolph Weinman,
to honor Muhammad and it bears no resemblance to
Muhammad. Muslims generally have a strong aversion to
sculptured or pictured representations of their Prophet.”
It is fitting to highlight the only American, John Marshall,
fourth Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, within the 18 great
lawgivers. The presence of his image connects the diverse
legal heritages and traditions of the world and the unique contribution of American legal and judicial systems to the historical development of law and justice. Chief Justice Marshall’s
1803 declaration in Marbury vs. Madison— “It is emphatically
the province of the judicial department to say what the law
is”—caused the United States Supreme Court to become the
world’s most powerful court. Few other courts in the world
have the same power of judicial review and none have exercised it for as long or with as much influence.
The Supreme Court has always been at the focal point of the
most bitter constitutional, political, commercial, and social
polemics in America. Even the Court views itself as the quiet
spot in the eye of a hurricane, going about quietly applying
6 Court Review - Winter 2004

permanent canons of interpretation to the settlement of individual disputes, just as Marshall planned. He would, however,
perhaps be surprised that the body of justices of the Supreme
Court has expanded over time to include women as well as
African-Americans, whose ancestors were slaves when he was
Chief Justice. Although he was one of the greatest lawgivers of
history, he was molded to his time, as were the other legendary
figures depicted in the friezes. It may have been impossible for
him to foresee, but surely he would be pleased at the racial,
ethnic, gender, and other aspects of diversity that America displays today.
TOWARD THE CENTENNIAL OF THE SUPREME COURT
BUILDING

As I recently admired this building from a distance, I
remembered that the Supreme Court Building had in major
measure been a winning battleground for bringing about the
national strength of diversity today. From this building, the
Court delivered since 1935 a series of landmark decisions of
tremendous impact. The most legendary of all is Brown vs.
Board of Education in 1954. The Court, with “Equal Justice
Under Law” engraved on its edifice, has delivered the ever-sobasic message that human beings of all races are created equal.
It provoked America, a country with a legacy of slavery and

Franz Jantzen, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States

NAPOLEON BONAPARTE (1769 – 1821)
Emperor of France, amid his many wars, ordered and directed the recodification of French law into what became known as the Code Napoleon or Civil
Code. Published in 1804, this code formed the basis for modern civil law and
had major influence on laws in Europe, Latin America, Francophone Africa,
and even in the United States in the state of Louisiana. Napoleon is reported
to have said: “My glory is not to have won forty battles; for Waterloo’s
defeat will destroy the memory of as many victories. But what nothing will
destroy, what will live forever, is my Civil Code.”
JOHN MARSHALL (1755 – 1835)
Fourth Chief Justice of the United States, his opinion in Marbury v. Madison
(1803) established the power of judicial review for the Court. Under his leadership, the nascent Supreme Court was able to advance to the position of a
fully equal branch of the federal government as envisioned in the
Constitution.
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE (1723 – 1780)
English law professor and jurist, he wrote the four-volume Commentaries on
the Law of England, an extensive description of the state of the English law.
His works had a major influence on England, the American colonies, and
other regions with common-law tradition.
HUGO GROTIUS (1583-1645)
Dutch lawyer and statesman, he wrote De Jure Belli ac Pacis (Concerning
the Law of War and Peace), which provided the basis of modern international law that nations are bound by common interests and mutual, enforceable agreements.

LOUIS IX (1213-1270)
King of France, he led the seventh and eighth Crusades to the Holy Land. He
instituted the first court of appeals known as the “Curia Regis,” recognizing
it as a citizen’s right to appeal a verdict in all cases. He was canonized as
Saint Louis.
KING JOHN (1166 – 1216)
Born John Lackland, King John signed the Magna Carta, which ensured that
neither he nor any future sovereign in England would be above the law. This
document, only realized after a revolt, would lay the foundation of constitutional equality and liberty in England.
CHARLEMAGNE (C. 742 – 814)
The Roman Emperor and King of the Franks, he united and Christianized
much of Western Europe in the Middle Ages, restoring order and education
to what became the Holy Roman Empire. During his realm, he was also a
reformer of judicial and military systems.
MUHAMMAD (C. 570 – 632)
The Prophet of Islam is depicted holding Qur’an (Koran), the sacred scriptures from God, or Allah in Arabic. The Qur’an provides the primary source of
Islamic Law, covering all private and public behavior.
JUSTINIAN (C. 483-565)
The Byzantine emperor ordered the codification of Roman law and published
Corpus Juris Civilis (“Body of Civil Law”), a coherent code that became the
basis for modern civil law and inspired the term “justice.”

Descriptions of the contributions of each lawgiver are mainly adapted from the public information sheet published by the Office of the Curator, Supreme
Court of the United States. Figures are described from left to right.

Jim Crow laws, to recognize human equality and the fundamental worth of every person without regard to race. It spurred
a civil rights revolution that has widened from fighting discrimination against African-Americans to that against other
ethnic minority groups, women, aliens, the elderly, the handicapped, and other classifications. Without the historical decision of Brown vs. Board of Education, it would be difficult for us
to imagine today’s America. It would be even more difficult to
visualize the modest diversity manifested in recent decades in
the body of justices at the Court itself, an institution steeped in
tradition and history.
As I ponder the underlying political, economic, social, and
international factors that may have induced these landmark
decisions, and as I pay tribute to those justices whose judgments and visions have shaped the nation’s strength of diversity, including Thurgood Marshall, who argued the case of
Brown vs. of Board of Education and later became the first
African-American to have served on the Court, I also feel more
exulted pride in the Supreme Court Building. It has proved to
be a standing symbol of our national strength of justice.
In little more than 25 years, the centennial celebration of

the Supreme Court Building will commence. I am confident
that by that historical occasion, the nation will become more
diverse and equitable, and will be even stronger as a result. I
am also confident that by then the body of justices of the
Supreme Court will include members from other minority
groups such as the Hispanics, Asian and Pacific Islanders,
Native Americans, and others. The ideal of diversity will at last
not only be reflected obviously on the walls and doors of the
Supreme Court Building, but also fully featured on the bench.
At that moment, this monumental building will also become
an indisputable symbol of national strength of racial and ethnic diversity.
Hongxia Liu is director of the American Bar
Association’s International Legal Resource
Center for the United Nations Development
Programme. She works in Washington, D.C.,
where she is the president-elect of the
Washington Foreign Law Society and a member
of the U.S. Supreme Court Historical Society.

Winter 2004 - Court Review 7

Problem-Solving Supervision:
Specialty Probation for Individuals with Mental Illnesses
Jennifer Skeem & John Petrila

O

ne of the most important developments in American law
over the last decade has been the exponential growth of
problem-solving courts. Such courts achieve efficiencies
by consolidating certain types of cases before specially designated
judges. Additionally, in many instances, problem-solving courts
adopt a therapeutic focus by attempting to achieve outcomes
(e.g., obtaining treatment for a defendant) that go beyond the traditional goals of the judicial system. A recent commentary in this
journal noted that “problem-solving courts generally focus on the
underlying chronic behaviors of criminal defendants.”1 These
courts include, but are not limited to drug courts, mental health
courts, domestic violence courts, and teen smoking cessation
courts. Perhaps the first prototypical problem-solving court was
the juvenile court. Today, problem-solving courts exist in many
countries throughout the world.2
Typically, problem-solving courts are designed to respond to
larger social problems that impinge on the justice system. Drug
courts and mental health courts in particular have emerged
because of the disproportionately high prevalence of substance
use and mental health disorders among criminal defendants.3 As
judicial caseloads and correctional populations swelled with individuals charged with drug offenses, some judges and court
administrators concluded that at least some defendants would be
better served by treatment programs than incarceration. In addition, it was assumed that the creation of special courts would take
pressure off other courts by removing certain types of cases (e.g.
typical first-time, nonviolent drug offenders in drug court cases)
from their dockets. As a result, drug courts were created: the first
in Dade County, Florida, in 1989. Such courts proved immensely
popular. Today there are more than 1,200 drug courts in existence or in planning, and more than 226,000 defendants have
participated in drug-court-related programs.4
Mental health courts have been created more recently. Like

drug courts, they are designed to divert certain individuals with
mental illnesses into treatment while consolidating their cases
before designated “mental health court” judges. These courts are
one response to the prevalence of mental disorders among defendants, which creates a burden that “threatens to overwhelm the
criminal justice system.”5 In its Criminal Justice/Mental Health
Consensus Project, the Council of State Governments recognized
mental health courts as one of several “workable options” that
communities with limited resources have developed to better fit
the system to the needs of these defendants.6 The first mental
health court of this era was created in Broward County, Florida,
in 1997.7 Today it is estimated that there are approximately 80
mental health courts of various types throughout the United
States.8 While at this point it is difficult to characterize the “typical” mental health court,9 most mental health courts appear to
have a consolidated docket of cases involving mental illness,
operate under a judge specially assigned to that docket, and
attempt to divert defendants into treatment and other services. It
appears that mental health courts are in a state of flux, with more
recently created courts willing to take jurisdiction over some
felony cases. This is in contrast to the “first generation” of courts
that tended to limit jurisdiction to misdemeanors.10
Both drug courts and mental health courts are based on the
theory of “therapeutic jurisprudence.” This theory assumes that
legal principles and processes should be examined for their therapeutic or non-therapeutic effect on individuals.11 Advocates for
therapeutic jurisprudence generally assume that traditional
adversarial court processes create impediments to achieving
therapeutic outcomes for defendants. As a result, drug courts
and mental health courts are usually less formal than traditional
criminal court, with judges and lawyers committed to finding the
best outcome for the defendant in concert with other parties in
the community, including social service and treatment agencies.

Footnotes
1. Daniel J. Becker & Maura D. Corrigan, Moving Problem-Solving
Courts Into the Mainstream: A Report Card From the CCJ-COSCA
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Drug courts are now assumed by most to accomplish their goal
of obtaining treatment for defendants, and preliminary research
suggests that mental health courts also may serve as an effective
gateway to treatment services.12
The development of problem-solving courts is sufficiently
advanced that discussions have begun about how to spread the
principles that underlie them more broadly through the legal system.13 These discussions are occurring simultaneously with discussion about the changing role of trial judges, which has been
hastened in part by the creation of problem-solving courts.14
Although these developments within the judiciary have occasioned healthy debate about their implications for the courts, the
impact on other parties has received less notice. Drug courts and
mental health courts may indeed facilitate access to treatment for
defendants, and even influence the success of treatment through
continued monitoring and the use of sanctions for noncompliance.15 However, the courts by necessity depend on others,
including social service agencies, treatment providers, and probation officers, to implement the mandate to participate in treatment. Like the courts, these parties have been influenced by
broader social phenomena and have adopted strategies to cope
with the demands of maximizing dwindling resources to serve
and supervise a growing high-risk population.
One particularly promising strategy is the development of
specialty caseloads for probationers with mental illness (hereafter, PMI). Probation officers with specialty caseloads play a
central role in monitoring and enforcing the conditions of probation, including the mandate to participate in treatment. Thus,
these officers combine two functions: they seek to assure public
safety (the traditional probation officer role), but also attempt to
assure the rehabilitation of the probationer (a therapeutic role).
Although such specialty agencies emerged at least two decades
ago, nearly half have been created over the past five years, mirroring the growth of problem-solving courts.16 In the rest of this
article, we describe the demands on probation officers of supervising PMIs, the unique response of specialty probation agencies
to these demands, and the relation between these agencies and
the courts. In doing so, we draw on recently conducted research
that elicited the views of probation supervisors, probation offi-

cers, and probationers with
mental illnesses regarding the
management of PMIs. We conclude with a summary of issues
that must be addressed if specialty agencies for PMIs are to
continue growing and succeed.

12. Roger Boothroyd, Norman Poythress, Annette McGaha, & John
Petrila, The Broward Mental Health Court: Process, Outcomes and
Service Utilization, 26 INT’L J. LAW & PSYCHIATRY 55 (2003); Merith
Cosden, Jeffrey K. Ellens, Jeffrey L. Schnell, Yasmeen YaminiDiouf, & Maren M. Wolfe, Evaluation of a Mental Health Treatment
Court with Assertive Community Treatment. 21 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW
429 (2003).
13. Fox & Berman, supra note 4.
14. Roger Hanson, The Changing Role of a Judge and Its Implications,
COURT REVIEW, Winter 2002, at 10. Hanson notes a number of
developments over the last few decades, including case management and the development of alternative dispute resolution
processes as contributing to the current debate over the role of
judging, along with the emergence of problem-solving courts. See
also, Arthur H. Garrison, Drug Treatment Programs: Implications
for the Judiciary, COURT REVIEW, Winter 2002, at 24.
15. Patricia A. Griffin, Henry J. Steadman, & John Petrila, The Use of
Criminal Charges and Sanctions in Mental Health Courts, 53
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1285 (2002).

16. Jennifer Skeem, Paula Emke-Francis, & Jennifer Eno Louden,
Probation, Mental Health, and Mandated Treatment: A National
Survey, (unpublished manuscript) (2003) [hereinafter National
Survey].
17. Lauren Glaze, Probation and Parole in the United States, 2002.
Available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs (last visited Dec. 31,
2003).
18. Harry Boone, Mental Illness in Probation and Parole Populations:
Results from a National Survey, PERSPECTIVES, Fall 1995, at 32;
James Byrne, Mentally Ill Offenders: An Overview of Issues,
PERSPECTIVES, Fall 1995, at 41.
19. PAULA M. DITTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, MENTAL HEALTH
AND TREATMENT OF INMATES AND PROBATIONERS, NCJ No. 174463
(July 1999).
20. Jennifer L. Skeem, John Encandela, & Jennifer Eno Louden,
Perspectives on Probation and Mandated Mental Health Treatment in
Specialized and Traditional Probation Departments, 21 BEHAV. SCI. &
LAW 429, 440 (2003) [hereinafter Perspectives on Probation].
21. Skeem, et al., National Survey, supra note 16.

I. THE UNIQUE DEMANDS
OF SUPERVISING
PROBATIONERS WITH
MENTAL ILLNESS

One particularly
promising strategy
is the development
of specialty
caseloads for
probationers with
mental illness.

In 2002, nearly four million probationers were supervised in
the community, easily making probation the prototypic correctional disposition.17 Although no methodologically sound estimate of the national prevalence of mental disorder among probationers is available,18 the results of a self-report survey suggests that over one-half million (16%) of these probationers suffered some form of mental illness.19 For the typical officer carrying a caseload of 125 probationers, then, facing the unique
demands of probationers with serious mental illness is an
inescapable fact of practice.
These demands were described in two studies conducted by
one of the authors (JS): one study involved a series of focus
groups with PMIs and with their specialty and general probation
officers in three major cities (Phoenix, Philadelphia, and Las
Vegas, N= 52);20 the other was a national survey of specialty and
traditional probation agency supervisors (N=91).21 These studies suggest that probationers with mental illnesses create four
significant demands beyond traditional probationers. First,
PMIs often have pronounced needs for treatment and other
social services (e.g., housing, SSI). These services not only fall
outside the range of officers’ ordinary practice, but also are difficult to access from underfunded and overburdened treatment
and social service systems. Second, some PMIs’ functional abilities are limited, such that they are unable to follow the basic
conditions of probation (e.g., working, paying fees, reporting to
their officer’s office), let alone navigate the complex social service system. Third, probation officers are expected to monitor
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and enforce PMIs’ compliance with the general conditions of probation as well
as special conditions of
treatment participation.22
Although probation personnel assume that treatment
compliance is essential to
successfully maintaining a
PMI in the community,23
the probationer’s complex
service needs render it relatively difficult and time consuming for an officer to monitor and
assure compliance.24 Fourth, PMIs often have substance abuse
problems. For probationers with both a mental illness and a
substance abuse disorder, the two problems can interact with
and exacerbate one another, rendering drug abstinence and
treatment response less likely.25
Probation officers may find these demands formidable, particularly while juggling a caseload of 125 or more probationers.
This context lends credibility to the widespread perception that
PMIs are at relatively high risk for probation violation and criminal recidivism.26
II. MEETING THE DEMANDS: SPECIALTY CASELOADS

offenders, youthful offenders, Spanish-speaking offenders, and
the like.29 Other relevant examples include the imposition of
special conditions for individuals found “guilty but mentally
ill,”30 and for juveniles under the jurisdiction of a juvenile mental health court.31 Several jurisdictions use drug offender probation, often in conjunction with drug courts, and evidence suggests that properly designed probation programs can reduce
recidivism and drug use.32
Like mental health courts and drug courts, mental health
probation has emerged as part of a larger movement in the criminal justice system toward specialization and problem-solving
for defendants with needs that do not respond to traditional
approaches. A recent survey of probation agencies in the U.S.
suggests that today nearly 100 probation agencies have adopted
specialty caseloads for PMIs, with 66 specialty agencies having
more than one exclusive mental health caseload.33 This survey
compared the 66 specialty agencies with more than one mental
health caseload with a sample of 25 traditional agencies matched
by population size and geographic region. These survey results,
combined with other work,34 suggest that the prototypic specialty agency is unique in structure and function in four important respects: caseload structure, case management approach,
the relationship between probation officers and probationers,
and the use of problem-solving strategies when conditions of
probation are violated. Each is discussed in turn below.

One response to these demands has been the creation of specialty probation caseloads designed exclusively for those with
mental illness. Given the complexities of supervising PMIs, the
Council of State Governments, in its Criminal Justice/Mental
Health Consensus Project, recommends explicitly the creation of
such specialty caseloads.27
Probation agencies have a relatively long history of creating
specialty caseloads for individuals perceived as having more
complex needs than other probationers. For example, special
caseloads or conditions of probation have been created for sex
offenders,28 domestic violence offenders, drug offenders, gang

A. CASELOAD STRUCTURE
The foundation of the prototypic specialty probation agency
consists of caseloads that are composed exclusively of PMIs, limited in size, and assigned to interested and specially trained probation officers. These caseloads’ most distinctive and perhaps
most important feature is their reduced size. Average caseload
sizes for officers in specialty agencies (N=40) are less than onethird that of officers in traditional agencies (N=130).35 In some
agencies, mental health caseloads are considered “high risk”
caseloads in need of intensive supervision, with appropriate

Probation officers
may find
these demands
formidable,
particularly while
juggling a caseload
of 125 or more
probationers.

22. Id. See also U.S. PROBATION AND PRETRIAL SERVICES, COURT AND
COMMUNITY (fact sheets on probation, Washington DC: Federal
Judicial Center) (2001).
23. DENNISE ORLANDO-MORNINGSTAR, GLEN SKOLER, & SUSAN HOLLIDAY,
A HANDBOOK FOR WORKING WITH MENTALLY DISORDERED DEFENDANTS
AND OFFENDERS (1999).
24. Steven Wormith & Frances McKeague, A Mental Health Survey of
Correctional Clients in Canada, 6 CRIMINAL BEHAV. & MENTAL
HEALTH 49 (1996).
25. See, e.g., Robert E. Drake, Fred C. Osher, & Michael A. Wallach,
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Study, 177 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 408 (1989); and Roger
Peters, William Kearns, Mary Murrin, & Addis Dolente,
Psychopathology and Mental Health Needs Among Drug-involved
Inmates, 11 J. PRISON & MENTAL HEALTH 3 (1992).
26. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, CONSENSUS REPORT, supra note 5.
27. Id.
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caseload caps set by agency policy.
Reduced caseloads are responsive to all four of the demands
associated with supervising PMIs described earlier. Individuals
with serious mental illnesses typically require substantially more
time from the probation officer than other individuals. While
this may not be true in every case, in general, a probation officer
must exert sustained effort to implement both the general conditions of probation and special conditions that mandate treatment, especially with probationers who have serious mental
health and substance abuse problems, and who need treatment
and other social services that may be difficult to access and limited in capacity. Given these difficulties and their impact on the
time an officer must spend on the case of an individual probationer, it is presumptively appealing to assign smaller caseloads
to expert officers who carry these probationers exclusively. In
traditional agencies, PMIs may be perceived as atypical “problems to the system” that drain resources from other cases.
Reduced mental health caseloads provide officers with the time
to develop and implement difficult social service referrals, handle crises, and intensively supervise these high risk individuals.
As specialty officers gain experience, training, and connections
with the social welfare systems, PMIs are transformed from
“problems to the system” to routine cases with an array of workable options. As explained below, however, maintaining smaller
specialized and exclusive mental health caseloads in the face of
pressing demand for probation services is one of the most significant challenges facing the legal system today.

on mental health proba[M]aintaining
tion in Broward County
may be required to comply smaller and exclusive
with some or all of the folmental health caselowing conditions:
loads . . . is one of
• Sign an authorization
the most significant
for release of all medical and psychological
challenges . . . .
records as deemed nectoday.
essary for the treatment
of mental illness and/or
supervision by the Department of Corrections (in Florida,
the State Department of Corrections oversees probation);
• Comply with a treatment plan approved by the court;
• Enter and actively participate in inpatient mental health
and/or drug and alcohol treatment or other facility deemed
appropriate by the Probation Officer;
• Enter and actively participate in outpatient treatment as
deemed appropriate by the Probation Officer;
• Submit to random drug and/or alcohol testing;
• Take all medications prescribed for the treatment of mental
illness;
• Not operate a motor vehicle;
• Submit to a mandatory curfew;
• Have no contact with the victim, directly or indirectly, unless
approved by the victim, therapist and sentencing court;
• Be responsible for payment for programs and services if
financially able.

B. CASE MANAGEMENT APPROACH
Mental health caseloads, the foundation of the prototypic
specialty mental health agency, are associated with a unique case
management approach. First, as suggested earlier, these caseloads create important administrative efficiencies. Unlike traditional agencies, where officers attempt to find a way to fit round
PMIs into a square supervision system on a case-by-case basis,
officers in specialty agencies follow or develop routines and procedures tailored to the PMI. For example, specialty agencies
often apply explicit definitions to determine which probationers
are eligible for specialty supervision, and impose special conditions by which these probationers must abide. Although referral processes and eligibility criteria may vary from agency to
agency, probationers must be mentally ill to be assigned to the
prototypic specialty agency. Broward County, Florida, provides
an example of how eligibility for mental health probation may
be defined. The administrative order establishing mental health
probation provides that “if deemed appropriate by the presiding
Judge and otherwise permitted by law, and with the specific
agreement and consent of the defendants themselves, defendants suffering from mental illness or mental retardation, as
diagnosed by a qualified mental health expert, may be sentenced
to a probationary period entitled ‘Mental Health Probation’ to be
supervised by specially designated Probation Officers within the
Department of Corrections.”36 Additionally, a defendant placed

Second, in addition to creating administrative efficiencies, the
prototypic specialty agency’s case management approach integrates internal (probation) and external (community) resources
to meet the PMIs’ needs. The specialty officer is not merely an
agent who “refers out” and then monitors compliance with the
conditions of probation. This officer also uses his or her
acquired skills and relationships with treatment providers and
other social service agencies to help address the PMIs’ needs.
Specialty officers typically work closely with treatment providers
as part of a team. They attend team meetings, help secure social
resources, and generally form connections with agencies that
facilitate efficient work with PMIs.
These close working relationships are crucial because probation officers oversee compliance with treatment typically provided by other entities. Thus, communication with providers is
essential for monitoring and ensuring treatment compliance.
The nature of close provider-officer relationships, however, is
critical. Close collaboration between treatment providers and
officers relates to low rates of probation violation—if the
provider does not merely become an extension of the oversight
role provided by the officer.37 When case managers become an
“extra pair of eyes” for officers, however, probationers are much
more likely to be threatened by their officer with incarceration
for noncompliance.38

36. Broward County, Florida, Admin. Order No. III-02-N-1A, In Re:
Order Concerning Creation of the Mental Health Probation
Program Within the Circuit Court Criminal Division (17th Cir.
Jan. 9, 2002).

37. Roskes & Feldman, supra note 34.
38. Jeffrey Draine & Phyllis Solomon, The Use of Threats of
Incarceration in a Psychiatric Probation and Parole Service, 71
AMER. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 262 (2001).
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above suggests that relationships in specialty agencies may more
often be characterized by a strong alliance and fairness than
those in traditional agencies. These differences in relationships
contribute significantly to a fourth unique feature of specialty
agencies: officers’ strategies for implementing the conditions of
probation, especially mandated treatment.

C. RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE
PROBATION OFFICER AND
THE PROBATIONER
In addition to close collaboration with treatment providers
to meet PMIs’ needs, the prototypic specialty officer typically
has a different view of his or
her role and relationship with
the PMI than the traditional
officer. First, traditional probation officers tend to emphasize public safety (“control”) as the
primary goal of probation, whereas specialty officers tended to
emphasize meeting the rehabilitative needs of probationers
(“care”) as well.39 These two roles are not completely at odds.
For example, specialty officers may assume that treatment and
rehabilitation lead to more independent functioning on the part
of the probationer: as the probationer becomes more stable and
assumes responsibility for his or her conduct, he or she presumably becomes less likely to engage in antisocial conduct.
Public safety may be particularly enhanced when the nowtreated mental illness played a causative role in the probationer’s prior criminal behavior.40
Second, in the focus groups conducted with officers and probationers, specialty probation officers with mental health caseloads defined their relationships with probationers differently
than traditional officers in three ways.41 First, specialty officers
reported adopting a more friendly, less authoritarian relationship with probationers than traditional officers; probationers in
turn tended to characterize their relationships with specialty
officers as more caring, supportive, and flexible. Second, maintenance of such a relationship was perceived as being less contingent on good behavior and compliance than was the case
with more traditional probation officers. Third, specialty officers were more concerned with establishing boundaries in their
relationship with probationers in order to maintain a distinction between the support offered as part of the professional relationship (which was permissible) and friendship (which was
not). This is not dissimilar to the boundaries that therapists
establish with patients for ethical reasons.
Given this, the quality of relationships between officers and
probationers may be defined by two related constructs: an
alliance (bond, partnership, and confident commitment) and a
“firm but fair” approach (clarity and voice, considerate respect,
and flexible consistency).42 The preliminary research described

D. PROBLEM-SOLVING STRATEGIES AS A RESPONSE TO
VIOLATIONS
A traditional response to violation of conditions of probation is the imposition of sanctions, for example, threatening to
revoke or revoking probation. In contrast, it appears that
problem-solving is the hallmark strategy of specialty officers
for addressing probationer noncompliance, with sanctions
generally used only if other strategies failed.43 In both the
focus group and survey studies described earlier, specialty officers were much more likely than traditional officers to respond
to a PMI who was noncompliant with treatment by talking
with him or her to identify any obstacles to compliance (e.g.,
he or she might prefer a different medication than the one prescribed), resolving these problems, and agreeing on a compliance plan. The officer would often include the probationer’s
treatment provider in this discussion. In contrast, officers in
traditional agencies were significantly more likely than specialty officers to respond to noncompliance by reminding the
probationer of the rules or by threatening to pursue incarceration if the probationer continued to disobey. In short, traditional officers tended to respond to noncompliance with
threats of sanctions and pursuit of sanctions, whereas specialty
officers called on a more varied set of strategies and used a
more graduated approach before pursuing revocation as
“absolutely the last resort.” 44
The effect of problem-solving and other enforcement strategies on PMIs’ treatment adherence and outcomes compared to
the use of sanctions such as probation revocation is unclear.
However, probationers and many probation officers in focus
groups viewed problem-solving approaches as more effective
than threats in securing compliance. Probationers appreciated
that their officers would have “fair conversations” with them
about noncompliance, be reasonable in accommodating legitimate problems with adherence, and be open and honest about
potential consequences. This sentiment is consistent with
research on procedural justice, which suggests that individuals
feel less coerced when they are treated with respect and allowed
to state their views.45 In contrast, probationers believed that
threats often created fear and avoidance, or alternatively, anger

39. JON F. KLAUS, HANDBOOK ON PROBATION SERVICES: GUIDELINES FOR
PROBATION PRACTITIONERS AND MANAGERS (1998).
40. Skeem, et al., Perspectives on Probation, supra note 20.
41. Id. at 444-445.
42. Jennifer L. Skeem, Probation Officer-Probationer Relationships
(2003) (unpublished measures for officers, probationers, and
observers). See also D.A. ANDREWS & JERRY J. KIESSLING, Program
Structure and Effective Correctional Practice: A Summary of CaVic
Research, in EFFECTIVE CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT 439-463 (R. Ross
& P. Gendreau eds., 1999); CHRISTOPHER TROTTER, WORKING WITH
INVOLUNTARY CLIENTS: A GUIDE TO PRACTICE (1999).

43. Skeem, et al., Perspectives on Probation, supra note 20; Skeem, et
al., National Survey, supra note 16.
44. Skeem, et al., Perspectives on Probation, supra note 20, at 449-452;
Skeem, et al., National Survey, supra note 16.
45. Charles Lidz, Steven Hoge, William Gardner, Nancy Bennett,
John Monahan, Edward Mulvey, & Lauren Roth, Perceived
Coercion in Mental Hospital Admission: Pressures and Process, 52
ARCHIVES OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 1034, 1039 (1995); Norman
Poythress, John Petrila, Annette McGaha, & Roger Boothroyd,
Perceived Coercion and Procedural Justice in the Broward County
Mental Health Court, 25 INT’L J. LAW & PSYCHOL. 517 (2002).

[I]t appears that
problem-solving is
the hallmark
strategy of
specialty officers
for addressing
probationer noncompliance . . . .
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and further noncompliance (“the more they threaten you, the
less a person will do”).46
In summary, the prototypic specialty agency is unique in (a)
its caseload structure (exclusive, reduced mental health caseloads managed by “expert” officers), (b) its case management
approach (creation of administrative efficiencies and integration
of internal and external resources to meet PMIs’ needs), (c) the
roles of probation officers (emphasizing “care” as well as “control”) and their relationships with probationers (strong alliances
and a “firm but fair” approach), and (d) officers’ use of problemsolving strategies to address probationer noncompliance.
Notably, the prototypic specialty agency defines a category with
indistinct boundaries: some specialty agencies share few features with the prototype, and thus are more similar to traditional
agencies (and vice versa). Several features prototypic to specialty agencies parallel features of problem-solving courts. In
the next section, we describe these parallels and address issues
associated with linking specialty probation with mental health
courts.
III. SPECIALTY MENTAL HEALTH PROBATION
CASELOADS AND PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS

difficult and most important
[I]t may be . . .
component of effective proba[wise] to rely on
tion work.50 In fact, according to Carl Klockar’s theory of
the power of the
probation supervision, effec- probation officer or
tive officers synthesize treatcourt to impose
ment and control by making
it clear to probationers over
sanctions, leaving
time that officers must abide the provider out of
by departmental rules, but
the fray.
want the probationer to succeed and will offer him or her
every reasonable aid to do so. The legalistic, surveillance element of the officer’s role is transferred to the (largely fictional)
oversight powers of the department, allowing a second critical
tool for securing compliance, i.e., rapport between the officer
and probationer, to remain intact:
I tell my probationers that I’m here to help them, to
get them a job, and whatever else I can do. But I tell
them too that I have a job to do and a family to support
and that if they get too far off the track, I can’t afford to
put my job on the line for them. I’m going to have to violate them.51

Both specialty mental health probation and mental health and
drug courts are confronting issues in the delineation of appropriate relationships with clients and in the use of sanctions for
noncompliance with treatment conditions. First, both specialty
probation agencies and problem-solving courts work with
clients who are required to attend treatment. Specialty officers
and judges alike may struggle to reconcile their “helping, therapeutic, or problem-solving role” with their “legalistic, or surveillance, role.”47 There are divided opinions about the extent
to which judges should embrace each role. Some judges who
administer treatment courts assume explicitly that it is appropriate for judges to assume a “therapeutic relationship” with the
defendant because the goals and values of such courts are explicitly therapeutic.48 Others argue that this may create boundary
issues if the judge later has to impose sanctions or that seeking
to create this type of relationship with a defendant is at odds
with the nature of judging.49
The probation literature (if not agencies) appears to assume
that both therapeutic and legalistic roles are an inescapable
aspect of supervision, and that reconciling them is both the most

The dual nature of the relationship between probation officer
and probationer, or between court and defendant, is made even
more complex by the expectations of other parties that may be
involved in the client’s treatment. This is true particularly of
treatment agencies that may wish to use the court or probation
officer to exert leverage on the client to comply with treatment.
Treatment providers may value coercive strategies for clients
who are acutely ill or do not adhere to treatment.52 The therapeutic relationship between treatment provider and client may,
however, be compromised if the provider issues threats or
applies sanctions for noncompliance with mandated treatment.
In such circumstances, it may be in the interest of both the
provider and client to rely on the power of the probation officer
or court to impose sanctions, holding the provider out of the
fray. Transferring the controlling aspect of these relationships to
the probation department may preserve the provider’s therapeutic alliance with the client, and the therapeutic alliance has been
shown to strongly influence treatment outcomes.53

46. Skeem, et al., Perspectives on Probation, supra note 20, at 454.
47. TROTTER, supra note 42, at 3.
48. Judge Peggy Hora and her colleagues write, for example, “[We]
propose to establish therapeutic jurisprudence as the [Drug
Treatment Court] movement’s foundation.” Peggy F. Hora,
William G. Schma, and John T. Rosenthal, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Movement:
Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System’s Response to Drug
Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439, 440
(1999).
49. Judge Morris Hoffman asserts, “The scandal of America’s drug
courts is that we have rushed headlong into them—driven by politics, judicial pop-psychopharmacology, fuzzy-headed notions
about ‘restorative justice’ and ‘therapeutic jurisprudence,’ and by
the bureaucrats’ universal fear of being the last on the block to
have the latest administrative gimmick.” Morris B. Hoffman,

Commentary: The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N. C. L. REV. 1437
(2000).
See also Andrews & Kiessling, Effective Correctional Practice,
supra note 42; Carl Klockars, A Theory of Probation Supervision,
63 J. CRIM. LAW, CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 550 (1972); TROTTER,
supra note 42, at 3.
Carl Klockars, supra note 50, at 554.
Charles Lidz, Coercion in Psychiatric Care: What Have We Learned
from Research?, 26 J. AMER. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 631 (1998);
Edward P. Mulvey, J. Geller, & Lauren Roth, The Promise and Peril
of Involuntary Outpatient Commitment, 42 AM. PSYCHOL. 571
(1987).
Ted P. Asay & Michael J. Lambert, The Empirical Case for the
Commo Factors in Therapy: Quantitative Findings, in THE HEART
AND SOUL OF CHANGE: WHAT WORKS IN THERAPY 23-55 (Mark A.
Hubble, et al. eds., 1999).

50.

51.
52.

53.
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Second, like specialty agencies, problem-solving courts
must address the appropriateness of applying sanctions,
including incarceration for
noncompliance. Drug courts
are based explicitly on the use
of a “carrot and stick” approach
in which the offer of treatment
is conditioned by the threat of
punishment if the defendant
does not comply with treatment.54 There is also evidence
that the threat of sanctions by
the court may increase defendant compliance with drug treatment.55 Mental health courts were initially more ambivalent
about the use of punishment, though this ambivalence may be
eroded as mental health courts increasingly assume jurisdiction
over felonies.56 What is clear is that we do not yet know the
comparative impact of sanctions, inducements, or a mixture of
the two on client compliance with treatment. There is anecdotal
evidence on all sides of the question, but until more definitive
research is done, the adoption of one or another strategy regarding the use of sanctions will be guided as much by intuition and
philosophy as empiricism.
Given parallels between specialty probation agencies and
problem-solving courts in their basic goals and approaches, it is
not surprising that the two are sometimes linked developmentally. For example, in our national survey of the use of specialty
probation, 15% of specialty supervisors described being affiliated with a mental health court.57 In Maricopa County, Arizona,
the mental health court was created years after specialty mental
health probation was established. As another example, in
Broward County, Florida, a felony mental health court was created after the adoption of mental health probation, in part so
that specialty officers would only have to deal with one judge
rather than several judges and in part so that a uniform philosophy would govern the use of mental health probation in the
county.58 In other instances (e.g., Seattle), specialty probation
officers were hired and trained specifically to work with referrals
from the mental health court.
Although the implications of these linkages are not yet clear,
logic and anecdotal evidence suggest that there may be both
advantages and disadvantages. Specialty probation officers who
work with a mental heath court might enjoy the affiliation for its
air of authority; familiar, team-based approach to ongoing problem-solving; and relatively predictable decisions. As court and
probation personnel became more familiar with one another and
with their shared caseloads, decision making may become more
efficient. On the other hand, specialty officers may view the
mental health court as a time-consuming process that increases

the risk that PMIs will be sanctioned. Because status hearings
are a form of monitoring, their use may detect more violations.
If more violations are detected and specialty officers’ discretion
to apply problem-solving strategies and graduated approaches is
reduced, sanctions may become more likely with the linkage.
Further research undoubtedly will reveal more about the relationship between specialty probation and mental health courts.

54. Heather Mactavish, Profile: Janet Reno’s Approach to Criminal
Justice, 4 UCLA WOMEN’S L. J. 113, 116 (1993).
55. Sheila Maxwell, Sanction Threats in Court-Ordered Programs:
Examining Their Effects on Offenders Mandated into Drug
Treatment, 46 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 542 (2000).
56. Griffin, et al., supra note 15.

57. Skeem, et al., supra note 16.
58. Broward County, Florida, Admin. Order No. III-03-S-1, In Re:
Creation of a Mental Health Court Subdivision Within the Circuit
Court Criminal Division (17th Cir. Oct. 17, 2003).
59. Skeem, et al., National Survey, supra note 16.
60. Id.

The overall
volume of
probation cases
means that
vigilance will
be required to
maintain reduced
mental health
caseloads.
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IV. THE FUTURE OF SPECIALTY MENTAL HEALTH
CASELOADS

As noted earlier, specialty probation for those with mental illnesses first emerged 25 years ago, with accelerating use in the
last 5 years. Although it is unclear whether specialty probation
will become a permanent part of the legal landscape, the average
age of specialty probation agencies (approximately 10 years)
suggests that they have some “staying power.” Moreover, certainly there is little evidence that the prevalence of mental illnesses among criminal defendants will abate in the near future,
or that the trend toward specialization within the legal system to
meet those needs has run its course.
As jurisdictions consider developing mental health agencies,
four issues in addition to those already discussed will need to be
considered. First, if specialty probation agencies have a “necessary ingredient,” that ingredient is probably structural, having to
do with the size of the caseload. Available data suggest that virtually all probation supervisors, traditional and specialty alike,
believe that a reduction in mental health caseloads with specialty officers is useful for supervising PMIs.59 In fact, the ability of specialty agencies to succeed may well depend upon the
department’s ability to maintain small, specialized caseloads
handled by specially trained probation officers. In the national
survey, the vast majority of traditional and specialty supervisors
viewed reduced mental health caseloads as “very” useful, but the
majority (56%) of traditional supervisors perceived reduced
caseloads as “not at all” practical in their department. Similarly,
some specialty agencies were being pushed toward larger caseloads. Although the majority (61%) of specialty supervisors perceived reduced caseloads as “very” practical, officers in nearly
one-quarter (23%) of specialty agencies were carrying higher
caseloads than those set forth in their policies. As explained earlier, larger caseloads necessarily limit officers’ resources for
supervising and meeting the needs of high-risk PMIs. Notably,
specialty agencies with larger caseloads shared relatively few features with the prototypic specialty agency. For example, large
caseload specialty agencies are significantly less likely than other
specialty agencies to use problem-solving approaches to address
probationer noncompliance.60
The overall volume of probation cases means that vigilance
will be required to maintain reduced mental health caseloads.
For example, in Broward County, Florida, an initial agreement to
limit caseloads for five officers who volunteered and were

trained to handle mental health cases was abandoned because
the state Department of Corrections insisted that caseload ratios
for probation officers be maintained at the level required for
DOC funding. As a result, caseloads are now larger, mixed
between mental health and general cases, and dispersed among
twelve officers who volunteered or were “drafted.” It may be that
legislative recognition of a special category of mental health probation is necessary in some jurisdictions to assure that reduced
caseload size and specialization can be maintained. Indeed,
some states have created line items in their budgets for supervising PMIs and parolees with mental illness in the community.61
Second, probation has long been a “practitioner-led”62 enterprise where the organizational culture of an agency and characteristics of individual officers strongly influence daily practice.
Thus, there is today little uniformity in training offered to either
traditional or mental health probation officers on topics associated with mental illnesses. Yet such training is essential, on a
wide variety of topics, including signs and symptoms of mental
illness; medications and their effects and side-effects; and creating and maintaining a relationship with an individual with a
mental illness. Similarly, articulated philosophies or standards of
practice for supervising PMIs would be helpful. Federal handbooks63 and large, well-developed specialty agencies in the
nation (e.g., Maricopa County, Arizona, Cook County, Illinois)
provide examples of philosophies, policies, and training programs that could serve as models.
Third, the issue of confidentiality is a significant one that has
become even more complicated with the adoption of the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) regulations on protecting the privacy of individual health information.64 There are provisions of HIPAA that permit the use and
disclosure of protected health information as “required by law”
including by court order.65 In addition, conditions of probation
may be written to require that the probationer consent to the disclosure of medical and mental health records. Given that the
number of parties involved in specialty probation may include
the court, the probation officer, and multiple treatment and
social services agencies, however, it will likely become necessary
in most jurisdictions to create formal agreements between the
various parties, consistent with HIPAA and applicable state law,
to govern the exchange of information. Alternatively, in the prototypic specialty agency, the probation officer often becomes part
of the treatment team, such that as a practical matter “confidentiality ceases to exist.”66
Finally, the recent explosion of mental health courts may facilitate the growth of specialty probation agencies in many jurisdictions, just as the creation of specialty agencies has prompted
some jurisdictions to move toward problem-solving courts. As
the opportunities to join these problem-solving agencies arise,
communities must strive to maximize the administrative effi-

ciencies and unique therapeutic potential of both systems while
avoiding the possibility of merely increasing surveillance of probationers. Achieving increased monitoring in the absence of
increased treatment access may do little to address the serious
treatment and social service needs of PMIs.
The unprecedented volume of individuals with mental illnesses and substance use disorders in the criminal justice system
has resulted in sweeping philosophic and operational changes
throughout that system. Specialty mental health probation is a
clear example of the continuing struggle to integrate concerns
with public safety and a more therapeutic approach to the needs
of defendants with serious mental illnesses.

61. Harry Boone, supra note 18.
62. KLAUS, HANDBOOK ON PROBATION SERVICES: GUIDELINES FOR
PROBATION PRACTITIONERS AND MANAGERS (1998).
63. ORLANDO-MORNINGSTAR, ET AL., supra note 23.
64. “HIPAA” refers to the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42

U.S.C.). The Department of Health and Human Services promulgated rules governing the privacy of health care information effective October 16, 2000. The regulations, as initia 45 C.F.R. §
164.512(a)(1) (2002).
65. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a)(1) (2002).
66. Skeem, et al., Perspectives on Probation, supra note 20, at 448.
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Smarter Sentencing:
On the Need to Consider Crime Reduction as a Goal
Michael Marcus

I

n February, 2004, Oregon Governor Ted Kulongoski directed
a newly created “Public Safety Review Steering Committee”
to “look at our public safety system from beginning to end”
and to develop “strategies to make the system stronger” wherever it does not sufficiently protect Oregonians.1 In common
with many states, Oregon long ago adopted a modification of
the penal code to declare crime reduction among the purposes
of sentencing. And in common with many states, Oregon has
adopted a sentencing guidelines model that roughly directs sentencing to reflect crime seriousness, criminal history, and
prison resources—largely or entirely ignoring crime reduction.
Apparently in common with all English-speaking and European
criminal justice systems, Oregon’s criminal justice system thus
exhibits a profound dysfunction: The successful culmination of
most combined law enforcement and prosecution activity is a
conviction followed by a sentence in a criminal case. Yet, most
sentences imposed on most offenders fail to prevent future criminal
behavior by the sentenced offender; most sentencing does not even
expressly attempt crime reduction.2
The participants in Public Safety Review Steering Committee
represented the typical range of diverse and strongly held views
as to the purposes, failures and successes of criminal justice.
They held opposing positions as to mandatory minimum sentences,3 the viability of general deterrence, and the division of
sentencing responsibilities between the judicial and the legislative functions (whether the latter is exercised by the people
directly through ballot measures or by the legislature). My
views on such matters are quite independent of the propositions asserted in this paper. The only debate we really need to

Astonishing as it should seem, there is a body of literature
that argues that sentencing should not be about crime reduction.4 But Oregon law is unambiguous, and no doubt typical of
most states. Oregon law has long declared public safety to be
at least among the purposes of sentencing,5 and that policy
choice was more recently enshrined in our state constitution by
vote of the people in Article I, section 15: “Laws for the punishment of crime shall be founded on these principles: protec-

Footnotes
1. Press Release, Governor Calls for Complete Review of Public Safety,
Governor Ted Kulongoski, February 26, 2004, accessible at
http://governor.oregon.gov/Gov/press_022604b.shtml.
2. See generally, Michael H. Marcus, Archaic Sentencing Liturgy
Sacrifices Public Safety: What’s Wrong and How We Can Fix It, 16
FED. SENTENCING RPTR. 76 (2003).
3. Oregon’s “Measure 11” crimes range from mid-level sexual assault
crimes; second-degree robbery, assault, kidnapping, manslaughter; and upward. ORS 137.700 provides mandatory minimum
sentences ranging from 70 to 300 months for these crimes, and
mandates that 15, 16, and 17-year-old offenders charged with
these crimes be tried as adults. Unlike the “three-strikes” provisions of many states (and Oregon’s “repeat property offender”
provision, ORS 137.717), the mandatory minimum provisions
apply regardless of the offender’s criminal history, though some
discretion to depart is afforded for some of the least serious of
these crimes. See ORS 137.712.
4. E.g., Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking
Preventative Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429
(2001). Professor Robinson actually argues that by diluting pure
pursuit of just punishment with public safety objectives, we sac-

rifice public safety. His reasoning reduces to this: citizens despair
that criminals are not suitably punished, lose respect for the criminal justice system, and are therefore less influenced by that system in evolving values such as those against drunk driving and
domestic violence. I submit, however, that it is obvious in the real
world that we do far more harm both to respect and to public
safety by persistently producing recidivism while denying our
responsibility for outcomes. “Preventive Detention” is a disparaging title opponents of incarceration assign to the incapacitation purpose of sentences. Their arguments are discussed later in
this paper.
5. ORS 161.025(1)(a) declares the purposes of Criminal Code,
including “To insure the public safety by preventing the commission of offenses through the deterrent influence of the sentences
authorized, the correction and rehabilitation of those convicted,
and their confinement when required in the interests of public
protection.” This was based on the 1962 Model Penal Code:
Sentencing §102.2. Tragically, there is at present a proposal drastically to retreat from the public safety focus of this provision of
the Model Penal Code. See Michael H. Marcus, Comments on the
Model Penal Code: Sentencing Preliminary Draft No. 1, 30 AM. J.
CRIM. LAW 135(2003).
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resolve before making real progress is already decided by
Oregon law, and by the expectations of most citizens in all
states: crime reduction is a major purpose of sentencing.
Notions to the contrary are dangerously wrong, however motivated.
All rational and informed participants and observers should
agree:
• Whatever the importance of other components of sentencing, crime reduction is a major purpose.
• Our actual accomplishment of crime reduction falls profoundly short of our proclamations and of our potential.
• To improve our crime reduction impact, we must change the
behaviors of those involved in producing sentencing decisions.
• To succeed, we must pursue strategies to focus criminal justice participants on responsible, informed, competent, and
effective pursuit of crime reduction through sentencing decisions.
CRIME REDUCTION IS AND MUST BE A MAJOR
PURPOSE OF SENTENCING

tion of society, personal responsibility, accountability for one’s
actions and reformation.”6

This is where some colleagues and attorneys begin to
become annoyed with me, but bear with me. The critical word
is “responsibly.”
First, most sentencing hearings (and probation violation disposition hearings) make no mention whatever of crime reduction.7 The typical dispute, once the legal range of any discretion is settled, is whether a given sentence is “sufficient” to
punish the offender adequately, or somehow “excessive” given
any disadvantages or ameliorating circumstances urged on
behalf of the offender. Indeed, as to felonies, Oregon’s sentencing guideline regulations merely mention “security of people in person and property,” while stressing “appropriate punishment,” inviting dispute as to “aggravation” and “mitigation,”8 and approaching any attempt at meaningful consideration of crime reduction only within the three (of 99) grid blocks
that address “optional probation.”9 No fair reading of the
guidelines or of the regulations can render crime reduction a
significant target of their attention. To this extent, the rules are
in substantial tension with the statutes and the Oregon
Constitution.
True, we send thieves to theft talk, drunk drivers to alcohol

treatment, bullies to anger counseling, addicts to drug treatment, and sex offenders to sex offender treatment. But we do
this as a matter of symmetry rather than of science: we do not
select offenders based on their amenability to treatment, but on
the crime they have committed. We do not select providers on
their impact on criminal behavior, but on their ability to provide timely paperwork. We may ask providers if offenders complete “the program” but we do not ask if they reoffend after
treatment. Again, the issue is responsible pursuit of crime reduction—not nominal pursuit. It is probably true that many people sent to these programs benefit, and that many do not. What
is certain is that we have made no responsible effort to find out
which programs reduce criminal behavior by which offenders—and, of course, no effort to use the results in making better use of these options.
Second, the public and some criminal justice participants
seem to operate on the assumption that incarceration is crime
reduction. There is a great deal to be said about the relationship between incarceration (incapacitation) and crime reduction. When all is said, it is obvious that while locking up some
offenders is indeed the best path to crime reduction, as to others there are real issues as to which offenders to treat in the
community, which to relegate to alternative sanctions, and
which to lock up, for how long, and under what conditions.
And it is abundantly clear that we are not smart about those
issues because we make no responsible attempt to tackle them.

6. Constitution of 1859; Amendment promoted by Crime Victims
United, referred by S.J.R. 32, 1995, and adopted by the people
Nov. 5, 1996.
7. Although therapeutic courts also generally avoid using crime
reduction as a measure of success, they are well outside my scope
of concern because they purposefully pursue an objective—usually alcohol or drug abuse reduction—that in turn strongly correlates with crime reduction. There are undoubtedly a few offenders whose freedom from addiction actually increases their efficiency in criminal activities, but the net crime reduction impact
of the therapeutic courts is quite probably far superior to the traditional means of processing the offenders they divert from the
regular criminal dockets. E.g., Drug Court Resources - Facts &
Figures, National Criminal Justice Reference Service, U.S.
Department of Justice (http://www.ncjrs.org/drug_courts/facts.
html); Looking at a Decade of Drug Courts (Rev. 1999), Drug Court
Clearinghouse and Technical Assistance Project (DCCTAP),
American University, sponsored by the Drug Courts Program
Office of the Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of
Justice (http://www.american.edu/academic.depts/spa/justice/
publications/decade1.htm). For a collection of more negative
assessments, see Drug Courts and Treatment as an Alternative to
Incarceration (http://www.reconsider.org/issues/drug_court/interesting_facts.htm), RECONSIDER: FORUM ON DRUG POLICY, and
authorities cited. Even the latter source shows our local drug
court (Multnomah County) as producing rearrest rates roughly
one-third as high as those for graduates of the traditional
approach. The sentencing support tools discussed in this article
show that our DUI court correlates with greater success for most
cohorts than our conventional correctional devices.
8. See OAR 213-002-0001, particularly:
(3)(d) Subject to the discretion of the sentencing judge to deviate
and impose a different sentence in recognition of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, the appropriate punishment for

a felony conviction should depend on the seriousness of the
crime of conviction when compared to all other crimes and
the offender’s criminal history.
(3)(e) Subject to the sentencing judge’s discretion to deviate in
recognition of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the
corrections system should seek to respond in a consistent way
to like crimes combined with like criminal histories; and in a
consistent way to like violations of probation and post-prison
supervision conditions.
9. See OAR 213-005-006:
(1) If an offense is classified in grid blocks 8-G, 8-H or 8-I, the
sentencing judge may impose an optional probationary sentence upon making the specific findings on the record:
(a) An appropriate treatment program is likely to be more effective than the presumptive prison term in reducing the risk of
offender recidivism;
(b) The recommended treatment program is available and the
offender can be admitted to it within a reasonable period of
time; and
(c) The probationary sentence will serve community interests by
promoting offender reformation.
(2) The sentencing judge shall not impose an optional probationary sentence if:
(a) A firearm was used in the commission of the offense; or
(b) At the time of the offense, the offender was under correctional
supervision status for a felony conviction or a juvenile adjudication as defined in OAR 213-003-0001(11); or
(c) The offender’s conviction is for Manufacture of a Controlled
Substance involving substantial quantities of methamphetamine, its salts, isomers or salts of its isomers, as defined at
ORS 475.996(1)(a).
(3) A probationary sentence imposed for an offense classified in
grid blocks 8-G, 8-H and 8-I when not authorized by this rule
is a departure.

SENTENCING DOES NOT RESPONSIBLY PURSUE
CRIME REDUCTION
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Part of the problem is that of the several camps around the
issue of crime and punishment, a deep divide undermines our
ability to be smart about such issues. One camp—I’ll use the
label “anti-incarcerationists”—is fairly characterized by a
strong conviction that we are in the midst of an unfortunate
trend towards “mass incarceration,” and that non-punitive
responses are both more humane and more productive of community safety than punitive sanctions. This camp cites to a
great volume of literature (produced by the bulk of academia,
which is similarly inclined) suggesting that at least for many
offenders, and at least as measured by recidivism after any jail
or prison term, well designed and delivered treatment programs
are substantially more likely to produce crime reduction than
jail or prison (or poorly designed or delivered treatment, for
that matter). There is even good evidence from this camp that
punitive sanctions, as well as poorly designed or delivered treatment programs, are often associated with increased recidivism
for at least some offenders.10
The anti-incarceration camp, however, is viewed with understandable suspicion by its opposite camp—for which I will use
the label “incarcerationists”—which clings to the conviction
that punishment and incapacitation offer the best road to public safety (and to just deserts) for all or virtually all offenders.
The understandable part of this suspicion is that the anti-incarcerationists almost entirely avoid confronting the crime reduction touted by the pro-jail camp: people in custody simply do
not commit crimes on the outside while they are inside.11 This
persistent avoidance of the strongest crime reduction function
of “punishment” gravely undermines the credibility of most
anti-incarcerationists except when they talk to each other.
They are accomplished at doing that; they do a lot of good
work; and they have much to teach us, but they rarely change
or improve anything in criminal justice—they just publish and
attend conferences to talk to teach other.
The anti-incarcerationists, for their part, are deeply suspi-

cious of the incarcerationists—whom they often deem “mass
incarcerationists” or “populist punitivists,” and disparage for
making the United States a leader among nations in incarceration rates. The anti-incarcerationists suspect that the real
agenda of their opponents is punishment for its own sake rather
than crime reduction. On the other hand, some anti-incarcerationists resist careful assessment of the evidence surrounding
the efficacy of incapacitation because they fear, essentially, that
their opponents are correct—that the surest way to prevent
crime on the outside, after all, is to lock up offenders for longer
and longer periods of time.
The following graphic illustrates the divide and how both
sides12 avoid a full picture of public safety:
To make a responsible effort at crime reduction, a sentencing
decision in which jail or prison is available must consider both
how much crime is likely eliminated during incarceration and
how post-incarceration criminal behavior is likely to be

10. See generally, D.A. Andrews, An Overview of Treatment
Effectiveness: Research and Clinical Principles, Department of
Psychology Carleton University, Ottawa Canada (1994);
Treatment Works for Youth in the Juvenile Justice System, National
cited
Mental
Health
Association,
and
sources
(http://www.nmha.org/children/justjuv/treatment.cfm); Mark
Gornik, Moving from Correctional Program to Correctional Strategy:
Using Proven Practices to Change Criminal Behavior, U.S.
Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, and
sources cited (http://www.nicic.org/pubs/2001/017624.pdf). P.
Smith, C. Goggin, & P. Gendreau, The Effects of Prison Sentences
and Intermediate Sanctions on Recidivism: General Effects and
Individual Differences (User Report 2002-01) Ottawa: Solicitor
General Canada, (http://www.sgc.gc.ca/publications/corrections/200201_Gendreau_e.pdf), cited in The Effects of Punishment
on Recidivism, 7 RESEARCH SUMMARY No. 3 (May 2002), Office of
the Solicitor General of Canada, (http://www.sgc.gc.ca/publications/corrections/pdf/200205_e.pdf).
11. I’ll concede exceptions for the likes of Charlie Manson and organized crime bosses.
12. There is a third camp worth mentioning here; I’ll call them the
“managers.” Their concern is short-run efficiency—literally the
speed of the plea bargaining and trial process, and the economy
and budgets of courts, law enforcement, indigent defense, and

corrections. They see the whole process as one calling for the
control of the use of whatever resources we have, and have
brought us the guidelines which generally seek to regularize the
use of hard beds in proportion to crime seriousness (measured
along an essentially deontological scale of just deserts) and prior
criminal history, with discretion to depart based on aggravating
and mitigating circumstances. They tout equal treatment and
resource regulation as major accomplishments, although their
success in both respects has its flaws. But they resist and avoid
statutory and constitutional prescriptions to seek public safety
through crime reduction because, in common with many in both
other camps, they assume that “public safety” is incarceration,
which they try to regulate as a matter of responsible resource
management, and because they are suspicious of the efficacy of
“rehabilitation.” For the managers, public safety is a function of
how much the public will be willing to spend on hard beds and
some programs, but that is someone else’s problem and responsibility: their’s is to keep the system running efficiently—like public transportation officials who have no interest in what commuters do when they disembark. Of course, the managers’ persistent myopia is their failure to appreciate the inefficiency of
incarceration that fails to divert offenders from criminal careers
and simply recycles them into the front end of the criminal justice system—after one or more new victimizations.
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affected. Both camps are right, after all: longer jail sentences
and prison do increase post-prison criminal behavior among
some offenders; incarceration does reliably prevent criminal
behavior (at least on the outside) during the period of custody—and, for some, after release. We cannot make these decisions responsibly by relying on the ideology, philosophy, or
what poses as the entrenched wisdom of judges—unless of
course our resulting enormous recidivism rates really are the
best we can expect to achieve.

It didn’t take long for me to realize after taking the bench in
1990 that the first offender is a rare occurrence in our system.13
It became immediately obvious that most of those we sentence
have been sentenced before, and that most would probably
offend and be sentenced again—often having produced another
victimization.14 The notion that we were actually managing
criminal careers occurred to me early in my own career as a
judge. That notion was soon followed by the suspicion and
then the conviction that we could surely do a better job of
diverting offenders from criminal careers if we made some substantial effort to do so—by employing data, evidence, and anything better than our various philosophies, assumptions, and
untested beliefs about how people work.
Most tragic are the serious crimes. Typically, a victim has
been grievously hurt, and the offender has been sentenced
repeatedly before committing this latest crime, often beginning
a criminal career as a juvenile. If only we had done something
effective before, we might have prevented both the victimization and the years of incarceration. Though there are surely
many crimes we could not have prevented, it is also certain that
we have not exercised our best efforts to prevent those that we
could have prevented—and highly likely that we would have
diverted many offenders from criminal careers, and prevented
many crimes, had we just made a responsible effort to do so.
In any event, there is no question but that recidivism rates
are abysmal. There are many measures, but they surely represent the impact of sentencing that is not responsibly aimed at

crime reduction. Of the 2,395 people jailed in Portland,
Oregon, during July 2000,15 1,246 had been jailed in Portland
on some other occasion within the previous 12 months. The
same was true as to 22 of the 32 jailed that month for burglary,
22 of the 23 jailed for robbery, 20 of the 26 jailed for first-degree
theft, 304 of the 372 jailed on drug charges, and 32 of the 39
jailed for vehicle theft. And “4% of our offenders accounted for
23% of [s]tandard bookings between 1995 and 1999.”16
Nationally, the figures are similar: the Bureau of Justice
Statistics reflects that “[m]ore than 7 of every 10 jail inmates
had prior sentences to probation or incarceration,” and that
“[o]f the 108,580 persons released from prisons in 11 States in
1983, an estimated 62.5% were rearrested for a felony or serious misdemeanor within 3 years, 46.8% were reconvicted, and
41.4% returned to prison or jail.”17 “Sixty-seven percent of former inmates released from state prisons in 1994 committed at
least one serious new crime within the following three years,”
and “272,111 offenders discharged in 1994 had accumulated
4.1 million arrest charges before their most recent imprisonment and another 744,000 charges within 3 years of release.”18
Oregon’s Department of Corrections publishes a recidivism
rate of 30%, and a target of 28%, but these figures are profoundly misleading as they only reflect convictions for a new
felony. This approach is typical of many state corrections
departments. Almost 80% of criminal incidents involve misdemeanors, including most thefts, drunk driving, most assaults,
and most crimes that affect public safety, so total recidivism
after prison is quite probably at least as high in Oregon as the
other statistics would suggest.19
The amount of custody available as a sentence varies as a
matter of law and as a matter of prison and jail resources. As a
matter of law, Oregon misdemeanors—again, almost 80% of the
crimes committed in our communities—cannot result in more
than one year in jail. As a matter of resource limitation, jails
often release offenders well before their terms are complete simply because there are an insufficient number of beds. As a practical reality, the crime-prevention impact of custody through
incapacitation may be extremely short in duration, and the possibility of any crime-increasing impact outweighing a short

13. The notable exceptions are impaired drivers and “johns” arrested
for prostitution—having mistaken an undercover “prostitution
decoy” for the real thing. There are recidivists among these
offenders, of course, but they are relatively rare—a good thing,
since they are also often quite dangerous.
14. We can choose to exclude drug crime as “victimless,” or recognize
that users victimize themselves, family, or friends who care about
or are dependent upon them, the communities that suffer from
the public manifestations of abuse, or those from whom they may
steal to support their addictions. Dealers may do all of this, and
also victimize those whose substance abuse they support.
Recognizing this extent of victimization, however, does not
resolve whether deployment of the criminal justice system is the
best way to combat substance abuse.
15. Portland Police Bureau Data Processing, August 25, 2000. The
Portland Bureau of Police stopped producing these statistics in
mid-2000; I am still awaiting their successor. An extract of the
statistics is available at http://www.smartsentencing.com.
16. The Booking Frequency Pilot Project in Multnomah County, Oregon:

A Focus on Process and Frequencies, at i (The Multnomah County
Sheriff’s Office, Dan Noelle, Sheriff, in collaboration with the
Multnomah County Department of Community and Family
Services, Department of Community Justice, Health Department,
and Corrections Health Division (January 2002)). Portland is the
largest city in Multnomah County, Oregon. “DSS-Justice” is a
data-warehouse-based criminal justice tool, which also supports
the sentencing support tools discussed later in this paper. See
http://www.co.multnomah.or.us/dss/info/initiatives/DSSProjectO
verview.shtml; http://www.lpscc.org/dss_justice.htm; http://www.
lpscc.org/docs/evaluation_capacity.pdf; and http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/SMMarcus/SentSuptTools.htm.
17. Bureau of Justice Statistics Criminal Offenders Statistics, found at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/crimoff.htm.
18. Bureau of Justice Statistics Criminal Offenders Statistics, found at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/rpr94.htm.
19. One measure is Multnomah County Court data showing new
felony case filings in 2003 at 6,114, and new misdemeanor case
filings at 23,737.

SENTENCING CURRENTLY DOES NOT ADEQUATELY
ACCOMPLISH CRIME REDUCTION
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period of protection is very, very real.20 As to this group, any
unbiased and reasonable examination of the data about the outcomes of past sentences—particularly in connection with the
abundant literature—must conclude that some offenders are
more likely to be diverted from future crime with one approach
at supervision, programs, jail, and other sanctions, while others
are more likely to be diverted from criminal behavior by another
approach. Consistently with most other human experience, different things play out differently with different people.
Even with felony crimes, we are again confronted with the
reality that the far more common crimes are the least serious,
for which neither the law nor corrections resources afford a
great deal of potential for incarceration. Under our sentencing
guidelines (which apply only to felonies), the more common,
lower-level felonies (predominately including drug possession,
property crimes valued at less than $5,000, except those of
“repeat property offenders,”21 and auto theft where the vehicle
is worth less than $10,000) are subject to a presumptive probationary sentence with jail not to exceed 30, 60, or 90 days.22
Prison becomes a presumptive sentence only at crime seriousness level 4 out of 11 levels (predominately including property
crimes valued at $5,000 or above, auto theft involving personal
use vehicles worth $10,000 or more, and the lowest level of
drug-delivery crimes), and then only for offenders with at least
two prior person felonies (or “repeat property offenders”). It is
only at crime seriousness level 5 (including property crimes
valued at $10,000) that prison becomes presumptive for most
felony offenders, and at 8 (including the most serious drugdealing crimes, mid-level sex crimes, burglary of an occupied
dwelling) for all. And the range of presumptive prison begins
at six months and doesn’t exceed three years until we reach
level 8, and then only for offenders with at least two prior person felonies. Even by departure, many of the lower-level
offenses are capped at 6, 12, or 18 months. So for most felony

sentencing occasions, the opportunity to do more harm than
good is entirely consistent with the recidivism data.
Even at the higher levels of felony crime, we often have substantial discretion to depart upward beyond mandatory minimum sentences, or to choose between consecutive and concurrent sentences. Our choices in this regard undoubtedly have a
public safety impact—as with all of our sentencing choices. We
would probably do a better job of exercising that discretion if
we made some responsible effort to analyze the likelihood that
offender characteristics, available programs in prison, or other
variables would make one offender more likely than another to
need extended incapacitation, or more likely to be safe to return
to society after serving concurrent time. At the very least, our
decision affects the availability of beds for those that should be
locked up longer to protect society.23

20. Our sentencing support data, discussed later in the text, confirms
the impression of the literature that for low level offenders, short
jail terms (one to five days) generally “work” better than longer
ones (30 days or more) because the shorter terms are less disruptive of circumstances supportive of lawful behavior: employment,
housing, and stable relationships. Higher up the range of incarceration, longer terms encourage accommodating life in custody
and associating with a prison population, and are thought to
enhance criminal thinking and values. See, e.g., Smith, Goggin,
& Gendreau, supra note 10. Of course, for some offenders, good
programming within prison can produce significant reduction in
post-prison criminal behavior. In my view, our persistence in
conducting the sentencing ritual as if crime reduction were not its
purpose ultimately undermines the ability of correctional authorities to provide programs in and out of custody that would serve
public safety if applied to the right offenders.
21. Oregon has adopted “repeat property offender” legislation to provide presumptive sentences of 13 or 19 months for persistent
property offenders. ORS 137.717.
22. Oregon’s guidelines are accessible at http://www.ocjc.state.or.us/
SGGrid.htm and the administrative rules are accessible at
http://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/rules/OARS_200/OAR_213/213_tofc.
html.
23. Even if proponents of prison can be confident in holding the line

against any reduction in the number of prison beds, economics
can limit the growth in that number over time. Moreover, hard
beds certainly compete with program expenditures for corrections
dollars—and program expenditures, at least for some serious
criminals, greatly affect the likelihood that they will reoffend
when returned to their communities. Again, the trick is to aim
the programs at the offenders who will benefit from them, and not
to fill slots with those who will not.
24. See 1997 Or Laws Ch 433.
25. The Oregon State Police began work on a public safety data warehouse that would have eventually supported such an effort, but
returned the balance of a federal grant and cancelled the project
rather than come up with matching money in the early days of
Oregon’s current budget crisis.
26. A data warehouse automatically collects copies of data stored in
multiple systems, and stores the resulting information in a form
and structure designed to facilitate analysis that would otherwise
require separate access to each of those systems and manual compilation of reports. Multnomah County’s “DSS-Justice” data warehouse, constructed and maintained under the auspices of the
Multnomah County Local Public Safety Coordinating Council, is
refreshed nightly from the source systems, and supports a host of
applications for criminal justice partners. See http://www.
lpscc.org/docs/overview_dss-j.pdf.
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MULTNOMAH COUNTY’S APPROACH—SENTENCING
SUPPORT TOOLS AND A REVISED ORDER FOR
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION

Although state law has since 1997 provided for the collection and management of criminal justice data to facilitate discovery of correlations between what we do to various offenders
and their recidivism rates,24 there is currently no effort at the
state level to implement this function.25 Multnomah County,
with the assistance of a public safety technology bond issue, has
constructed a data warehouse26 and related criminal justice
applications that provide this function to practitioners.
A user of this DSS-Justice sentencing support application
(one of many criminal justice applications based on the warehouse) enters a case number and selects the charge for which a
sentence is being imposed. The program constructs a bar chart
based on data for the offender and the charge selected. The
chart includes a bar for sentencing elements imposed on such
offenders for such a charge, arrayed left to right in order of their

to expand it to compare offenders, like the one before the court,
who have been sentenced for
any crime. We may want to
focus on those sentenced for
felonies or only Class A felonies
to distinguish among levels of
drug involvement. We may also
want to modify what we mean
by “similar” offender. For example, the prosecutor may provide
evidence of a criminal record
from outside the data known to
the tools. A user can access
“profile” to revise the criminal
history ratings in each of the
crime categories. In a similar
fashion, the user can correct age
or even gender errors, or
broaden or eliminate the “profile” categories to analyze a
broader cohort.
Finally, users can modify the
outcome measure. The default
Screen Shot of a Sentencing Support Display
measure of recidivism is a new
conviction for a similar crime
within three years. Users can specify instead conviction for a
declining frequency.27 Each bar reflects the proportion of those
specific crime, for “any crime,” or for a crime in any of the six
receiving that sanction who were free of any new conviction for
crime categories. Users can also modify the period during
a similar crime within three years. Note that this approach diswhich recidivism is tallied (six months, three years, five years,
plays incarcerative and non-incarcerative sanctions side by side,
or any time since sentencing), and can choose to focus on
measured by precisely the same test.
arrests instead of convictions (particularly useful in domestic
The right side of the screen displays the variables upon
violence cases).29
which the bar chart is based. By default, the user’s choice of
The point of all of this is not to rely upon technology to
crime for sentencing yields a variable that chooses one of six
select a sentence, but to focus the attention of the sentencing
categories of crime as a “similar crime.” For example, choosing
process on public safety through crime reduction. Of course,
first-degree theft yields a default of “property crime,” so that the
the tools cannot tell us with whether the results were caused by
program is analyzing sentences imposed on similar offenders
the disposition, or if variables unknown to the program account
for any property crime. By default, a “similar offender” is one
for disparate results. But they give us a good look at our past
who has a similar criminal record and similar demographics
results, and provide far more information than ever before
(age, gender, and ethnicity). A “similar” criminal record is one
available. More importantly, they focus the attention of the parthat reflects the same rating, from “none” to “severe,” in each of
ticipants on crime reduction. Just as sentencing guideline
six crime categories: violent crime, sex crime, property crime,
grids, carried dutifully by practitioners into every courtroom,
drug crime, major traffic crime (including impaired driving),
ensure the presence of the ephemeral calculus of guideline senand domestic violence.28
tencing, sentencing support tools can encourage all to rememUsers can modify all of the variables and generate a new bar
ber that we are supposed to be seeking crime reduction. With
chart in seconds. For example, if we are dealing with a comthat focus, advocates and probation officers can supplement the
mon cohort, we may be able to focus on only those offenders
data available from sentencing support tools with information
sentenced for the same crime as the offender before the court,
about the offender’s particular circumstances or treatment hisso the program allows a user to change “property crime” to
tory, the availability or not of local community-based or custo“Theft I.” If the offender’s cohort is less common, we may have

27. Bars display only for those sentencing elements that have been
imposed at least thirty times for the cohort in question, but a table
below the bar chart displays all data for all elements imposed for
the cohort. The thirty-occasion minimum discourages predictions based on insufficient data.
28. Data rules determine whether a given criminal history receives a
rating of “none,” “low,” “moderate,” “major,” or “severe.” In all

but domestic violence, only convictions count; arrests not followed by dismissal for want of merit (as opposed to mere loss of
victim cooperation, for example) do elevate a domestic violence
rating. The rules are accessible at http://www.ojd.state.or.us/mul/
marcus_crimethemegrid.pdf.
29. A step-by-step description, with screen shots, and a link to a user
manual are available at http://www.smartsentencing.com.
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dial programs, or with research germane to a particular sentencing analysis.
As part of the same effort, we have begun building a new
partnership between the courts and probation officers, encouraging officers to discuss their assessments and expertise around
the literature of criminology and corrections with courts on the
occasion of probation violation allegations. We have added a
box to the standard order for a presentence investigation,
requesting that the report include “analysis of what is most
likely to reduce this offender’s future criminal behavior and
why, including the availability of any relevant programs in or
out of custody.” Pre-sentence investigation writers now regularly include an analysis of what is most likely to work, citing
literature and sentencing support results to the court.
PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVEMENT

I have made some additional proposals to the Adult
Sentencing Subcommittee and to the Public Safety Review
Steering Committee, generally intended not as changes to substantive law but as strategies for increasing the focus of advocates and decision makers on the issue of crime reduction.
Specifically, I proposed that data and research concerning crime
reduction be expressly30 recognized as a consideration in departures under the guidelines, decisions whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences, whether to “remand” a juvenile to adult court,31 and whether to continue, modify, or
revoke a juvenile or adult probation. Because of suspicion of
“research” and researchers in some quarters, these proposals
remain on the table so far only because references to “data and
research” have been replaced with references to “reduction in
criminal conduct and crime rates.”
Another proposal still on the table32 is that the legislature
direct the Criminal Justice Commission to explore the feasibility of incorporating crime reduction into the contours of the
sentencing guidelines—which presently are organized around
just deserts, criminal history, and prison resources to the virtual
exclusion of crime reduction. It has been my position since the

30. The law surely does not forbid consideration of public safety
implications when a judge exercises discretion in any of these
areas, but participants rarely address those implications. The
hope is that when public safety impact is an expressly articulated
consideration, it will receive more frequent attention than when
its role is merely permissive and implicit.
31. The proposal would not affect the automatic remand of juveniles
whose crimes and ages fit within mandatory minimum sentencing
provisions introduced by “Ballot Measure 11,” ORS 137.700.
32. One withdrawn proposal is for resurrection of the Public Safety
Data Warehouse and replication statewide of the Multnomah
County sentencing support application. It was clear that this
failed the “reasonably available economic resource” test in this
budgetary climate.
33. There are endless possibilities, ranging from the modest to the
comprehensive. In one real sense, making crime reduction
impact an express consideration for departures would itself add a
public safety dimension to the guidelines. The availability of a
program in the community (or in custody, for that matter) that is
more likely than other sanctions to reduce recidivism could be a
consideration for all sentences that approach the divide between
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guidelines were first under discussion that a sentence most
likely to result in crime reduction ought to be the presumptive
sentence absent a substantial and compelling reason to seek
some other purpose—but merely adding crime reduction to the
mix that determines what is a “presumptive” sentence would be
a profound improvement.33
Other proposals may find their way to other subcommittees
of the Public Safety Review Steering Committee: that the
Department of Corrections be directed to include misdemeanors in their published recidivism rates; that the statute
governing presentence investigations be amended along the
lines of Multnomah County’s modification to the form for
ordering such investigations; that other counties somehow be
encouraged to emulate Marion County’s “Project Bond;”34 that
probation officers’ roles be modified along the lines encouraged
in Multnomah County.
But my overall hope is that this work actually produce something of real magnitude. If all we accomplish is some minor
adjustment to a system that produces the recidivism I have
described, we will not begin to reach our true goals. We may
make some real progress by pursuing the sort of strategies I
have suggested.
OBJECTIONS TO AND CONCERNS ABOUT THIS
APPROACH

Subcommittee participants and others have raised a variety
of objections and concerns about injecting crime reduction
analysis into sentencing, plea bargaining, probation, or other
criminal justice functions.35 A discussion of a few follows. Of
course, Oregon law requires that we consider public safety in
sentencing. Whether or not we do so, however, our choices
have outcomes in the sense that some choices will not prevent
future victimizations while others may; our present performance is abysmal when measured by public safety. Trying
harder to achieve best efforts should help. Avoiding those
efforts certainly will not.

presumptive prison and presumptive probation—or indeed, for
all sentences. And it might make sense to use a risk prediction
instrument to posit a presumptive period of incarceration for all
crimes for which incarceration is plausible; it makes no sense to
ignore psychopathy around violent crime in particular.
Ideally, within the limits of proportionality, risk prediction and
assessment, criminogenic factor analysis, and resources would
drive the articulation of a presumptive sentence for all crimes and
criminal histories, with departures based on compelling and substantial reasons to forfeit crime reduction for some other purpose
becoming the exception. But a journey of ten thousand miles
begins with a single step.
34. “Project Bond” is an undertaking promoted by Circuit Judge
Pamela Abernethy of Marion County. Based on literature documenting the crime-reduction efficacy of such intervention in the
target “at risk” families, this effort involves adult offenders, whose
household includes very young children, in parenting education
and appropriate social services.
35. Space does not allow a full consideration of all of these, but most
are considered at length on the “Frequently Asked Questions”
page of my website at http://www.smartsentencing.com.

Concerns about the impact on the length of custodial
sentences or the severity of sentences
As might be expected, one camp fears that adding any subject to sentencing analysis just provides another opportunity to
find some excuse for a lighter sentence, while the other camp
fears that pursuit of crime reduction will result in longer sentences. The combination is a de facto collusion in favor of the
pursuit of other objectives, or a pursuit of crime reduction
devoid of information. Whatever might be said of a system
with unlimited jail terms and beds, for the vast majority of our
sentences, law and resources make sentences long enough in
their own right to achieve sustained crime reduction simply
unavailable. Smarter sentencing for most occasions means
using scarce resources more intelligently—using longer terms
on those whose criminal behavior is best reduced with longer
terms, and shorter terms with effective programs and treatments for those whose crime reduction is best achieved by that
approach. Smarter sentencing does not inherently increase or
decrease the total amount of jail and prison time served by
offenders—its function is to make the allocation of that jail and
prison time more efficiently productive of crime reduction
through more intelligent decisions about which offenders to
imprison for longer terms and which for shorter.
As to longer terms and more serious crimes, the stakes
increase but the principles do not vary. Whether to run sentences consecutively or concurrently has a real public safety
impact as to an offender’s likelihood of reoffense. This decision
also has a real impact on the distribution of prison resources—
hard and soft—which in turn impact our success at crime
reduction for other offenders. Making these decisions without
attention to and information concerning crime reduction can
only undermine their accuracy.
To those who favor prison I suggest that we have to face the
reality that we cannot use it forever on everyone, that we must
responsibly allocate what resources we have to achieve the
greatest public safety, and that we must use intelligence and
scarce resources—including alternatives, treatment, and programs as well as incarceration—to achieve our best efforts at
diverting an offender from crime before the next victimization.
If prison is always best, carefully examining the data should
generate more support for hard beds.
To those who disfavor prison, I suggest that the limitation of
jail and prison time at the lower levels provides the best opportunity to establish and exploit the efficacy of responsible treatment, that demonstrating within the criminal justice process the
crime reduction impact of these approaches can only build support for improved and expanded treatment and alternative

resources. The public cannot be expected to relax the security
it believes that it has gained from mandatory imprisonment
until and unless it has been convinced that public safety is reliably achieved for some through other approaches.
Indeed, both camps are right about different offenders. The
real question is which ones—and we cannot expect to answer
that question without information.

36. Or. Const, Art. I, § 15.
37. Specific deterrence is the effect on the offender who is punished,
with the assumption that an offender will avoid behavior in the
future that resulted in punishment in the past. General deterrence is the effect on potential offenders in general—the prospect
of being punished makes some of these decide not to commit
crimes they otherwise would commit. I suspect that the efficacy
of specific deterrence is minimal to none for most offender
cohorts, as poignantly demonstrated by persistently punished
offenders. The literature around specific deterrence suggests that
for some cohorts, punishment increases recidivism—at least as

measured after incapacitation, but it clearly appears to work on
others. Literature suggests (albeit essentially on an a priori basis,
hypothesized with the use of economic models) that any efficacy
of general deterrence depends on the certainty and swiftness of a
sanction—not its severity.
38. ORS 161.025(1)(a) provides that criminal sentences seek “[t]o
insure the public safety by preventing the commission of offenses
through the deterrent influence of the sentences authorized, the
correction and rehabilitation of those convicted, and their confinement when required in the interests of public protection.”

Concerns about the impact on the “other purposes” of
sentencing
Although we now may speak of “protection of society, personal responsibility, accountability for one’s actions and reformation,”36 these overlapping objectives capture but do not displace the traditional purposes of retribution, rehabilitation,
deterrence (general and specific),37 and incapacitation. Oregon
law already identifies most of these as tools of crime reduction.38
Although retribution per se has no purported role in crime
reduction (outside the scope of the death penalty), the remaining functions are clearly not “displaced” just because we consider public safety. And to whatever extent general deterrence
actually works to control crime, retribution obviously overlaps
that function, as does any substantial sanction. My experience
is that the overwhelming majority of cases evidence no tension
whatever when we consider first our best public safety result,
and next the remaining concerns. That which is best for public safety usually satisfies any need for denunciation, victim satisfaction, rehabilitation, or confinement. It is also my experience that many victims who exercise their right to be heard at
sentencing spontaneously articulate the objective of preventing
others from suffering a loss, injury, or other victimization at the
hands of the offender.
There are some significant exceptions of course. Classic are
the social drinker who kills a stranger while driving and in fact
swears off alcohol for life as a result, or the truly opportunistic,
intra-familial sex offender who will indeed benefit from treatment and avoid recidivism under supervision. Social and victim needs may well eclipse any sentence based on crime reduction alone in these and other cases. But my proposals do not
urge or require that we abandon the “other purposes” of sentencing when they in fact conflict with best crime reduction
practices. In the vast majority of cases there is no conflict. In
those in which crime reduction conflicts with some other purpose, our task is to make the best choice—which may require
displacing crime reduction as the primary objective of a sentence. That is no excuse, of course, for abandoning crime
reduction as our lodestar in all other cases.
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Concerns about the competence of the participants and the
reliability of risk prediction
Opponents of risk prediction by judges or with sociological
instruments deem incapacitation in the interests of crime reduction “preventive detention” to disparage it, and point to literature stressing the “false positives” of incarcerating those who in
fact would not reoffend if unconfined. Proponents of incapacitation for public safety insist that incarceration is the most reliable means of crime reduction while an offender is locked up,
and fear that releases based on risk prediction will (as they have)
produce “false negatives” in the form of victimizations, including rape and murder. Academics fear that judges and lawyers are
not up to the task of handling this level of information.
Again, if the measure of success is crime reduction, we are
doing a terrible job in light of our recidivism data. Determining
the length of jail or prison terms by some measure other than
crime reduction cannot improve its success at crime reduction.
In other words, we surely have more “false positives” in terms
of locking up those whose incarceration is not necessary for
crime reduction if we do not even consider crime reduction in
the mix—at least in the context of the nation with the highest
rate of incarceration in the Western world. Those who fear
“false positives” would change the definition of error, not
improve our ability to avoid it. They also miss this important
point: an offender who has committed a serious crime and represents a substantial risk of reoffending may and should be considered for longer incapacitation even if we cannot be certain he
will reoffend.
As to false negatives, they, too, must be higher if we ignore
information than if we make an attempt to use it wisely. After
all, we almost always impose less than the maximum sentence,
jail authorities are often forced to release many before the
imposed sentence is served, and most offenders are released
before trial. Indeed, jails already use risk-prediction instruments
and matrices for these decisions, and are probably doing a much
better job of keeping the worst offenders in custody than we
would left to our own devices. Sentencing with knowledge of
the matrix release realities, and with information upon which to
exercise our own best efforts is more likely to reduce false negatives than rejecting the role of risk assessment and continuing
the status quo, resulting in shorter than maximum terms, matrix
releases free of the crucible of the adversarial process in court,
and pretrial release compelled by limited jail space.
Academics worry that lawyers and judges are not up to this
kind of work. Put aside that judges often resolve battles of
experts—who often cite research—in litigation involving malpractice, product liability, and intellectual property rights. The
fact is that most judges already try to choose sentences that may
reduce crime, and many lawyers join in with snippets of wisdom or folklore about what works or not: “Do not lock up my
client so long that he will lose his job; we all know that unemployment is criminogenic.” We are making decisions daily with
this level of discussion and thought. Surely our results would
be improved with increased attention to the data and to the literature, and increased application of competent advocacy to the
examination of any such proposition and its application to a
given offender.
If we disqualify participants from this subject, we certainly
cannot expect best efforts or best results from the process.
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Concerns about the reliability of research and data
The most extreme resistance to research takes the form of
rejection of virtually all research as imperfect because it fails to
follow the ideal research design of random assignment control
group analysis. Even assuming it were somehow feasible to subject every sentencing option available in every jurisdiction to
such a study, refusing to allow any increased attention to public
safety or involvement of data and research in sentencing decisions until those studies were complete is itself wholly irrational.
We are not assessing sentencing as a possible activity pending
due diligence as to whether it should be done at all—sentencing
is under way, daily, with demonstrably dangerous results. Those
who insist on ideal research before using any research or making
a better attempt at crime reduction hold their own views to no
such standard (citing, for example, correlations between prison
bed numbers and crime rates as proof of the efficacy of jail and
prison). They surely offer no research—ideal or otherwise—to
argue that continuing on our present course is more productive
of public safety than making our best efforts with imperfect
information. Moreover, what matters is what works on which
offenders, and the best of studies will always leave unanswered
the question why even a sanction that works so does on some
but not all members of the group that proves “success.” True,
we need to be critical and to recognize the limitations of predictability, the flaws in research, and the great deal we do not
know. Demanding that the adversarial process employ information and address the goal of crime reduction is surely more likely
to do a better job of reducing recidivism than awaiting perfect
research while making no informed or serious attempt meanwhile to achieve smarter sentencing.
Concerns about the energy and time smart sentencing
would demand
Judges, prosecutors, and administrators are concerned with
how long hearings take, and are concerned that any change will
increase the inefficiency of the process—on a case-per-unit-time
basis. They fear that any attention to crime reduction will necessarily result in protracted hearings with experts, additional
indigent expense funds to pay for them, and clogged dockets. It
seems to be in the nature of social activities that they take on a
life and meaning of their own, and that as participants we find
ourselves blithely accepting the needs of the system rather than
focusing on its public purposes. Managers of public transportation want the trains to run on time, but pay little or no heed to
what the passengers do when they get where they are going.
Likewise a criminal justice system that looks from the inside as
if the highest objective is to resolve as many cases as quickly as
possible, with plea bargains, jury waivers, truncated evidence—
whatever it takes. Presiding judges and court administrators,
supervising defense and prosecution attorneys, do not ask us
how just a result we have facilitated, and they certainly do not
ask how effectively we have reduced criminal behavior.
All that being said, there is nothing about considering crime
reduction that takes it outside the normal systemic factors that
determine how much energy a topic actually receives from the
process. At the high-volume end of the system, where cases are
negotiated in minutes, we can only expect fleeting references to
the notions of criminogenic factors and incapacitation.
Practitioners can gradually become more fluent in what we

know about which offenders, just as they do now on topics
such as the latest alternative sanctions, jail practices, suppression case law, or changes in local court procedures. As they do
so, they can replace some verbal content of typical plea negotiations with growing attention to routine factors affecting best
crime reduction practices in a given set of circumstances—and
they can do so without losing anything of value in the discussion, without adding to the duration of the exchange, and with
some increased hope of improving the likelihood that a resulting sentence will actually prevent future crime.
At the other end of the spectrum, we already have hearings
with experts and what amounts to risk assessment in death
penalty and dangerous offender proceedings. There is room for
varying levels of intensity in the consideration of relevant sentencing data and research along the entire spectrum of criminal
practice; there is no level at which its increased presence would
be unlikely to improve our public safety performance. Yes, we
could afford to spend a bit more time and energy seeking smart
sentencing across that range. But even if reducing the human
cost of victimizations is not enough to convince the managers,
this should be: The biggest inefficiency of time and resource is
the persistent offender; to the extent that smart sentencing
offers an opportunity to divert offenders from criminal careers,
even managers should at least take heed that speed is not our
most important product.
CONCLUSION

Oregon’s governor gave his steering committee an ambitious
charge—to ask “whether the system we have in place sufficiently protects Oregonians” and, if not “to look for short and

long-term strategies to make the system stronger.” The recidivism we produce by doing things the way we have been doing
them answers the first question unambiguously. The strategies
proposed here would make the system stronger by encouraging
practitioners to bring crime reduction into actual focus in criminal sentencing proceedings.
Others may have better or additional strategies. But merely
looking for places to tweak the skirmish lines among those who
favor custody, those who fear mass incarceration, and those
who mostly manage can never yield the substantially better
results the public needs and deserves. Our public safety problem surely includes persistent offenders and pervasive recidivism. Can smarter sentencing not be among the responses?
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Racial and Ethnic Bias
in the Courts:
Impressions from Public Hearings
Elizabeth Neeley

A

ttitudes toward the courts can affect the way individuals
perceive their role in the justice system: their willingness
to comply with laws, report crimes, file legal suits, serve
as jurors, and so on.1 In short, a positive public perception of
the courts is “critical to the maintenance and operation of the
judicial system.”2 Given the import of these perceptions, a substantial body of research has examined the factors that explain
differing levels of support for the court system.3
Although many of these studies examine national samples
or examine attitudes toward the U.S. Supreme Court, it is
beyond the scope of those findings to measure attitudes toward
state and local courts. Prior research shows that there is often
an aura of remoteness concerning the U.S. Supreme Court,
whereas state and local courts are not only more visible, but
have a direct effect on citizens’ everyday lives.4 This is consistent with research by Tom Tyler, who found that personal experiences with legal authorities affect an individual’s evaluations
of those entities.5 Additionally, state-level data can improve on
nationally aggregated data, which can mask important differences and issues between states.

Of primary interest to this article is the role that race and
ethnicity play in explaining varying levels of support. Research
has shown that racial and ethnic minority groups in the United
States hold more negative perceptions of the justice system
than do whites. 6 Although these studies have been successful
at identifying different perceptions toward the courts (in terms
of fairness, differential treatment, access to services, etc.)
between whites and minority group members, the quantitative
nature of these studies fails to provide insight into why these
perceptions exist.
The present study expands upon past research on minority’s
perceptions of the justice system by employing a qualitative
methodology, allowing participants to explain in their own
words their lived experiences and to express their perceptions
of the justice system without the confines of a survey instrument.
In 2002, the Nebraska Minority and Justice Task Force, an
organization established by the Nebraska State Bar Association
and the Nebraska Supreme Court, conducted a comprehensive
examination of racial and ethnic bias in Nebraska’s justice sys-
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tem. As part of their research program, the task force held eight
public hearings in five cities across Nebraska between January
and May of 2002 to obtain public perceptions about the courts.
Data for this article are based on testimony obtained from these
public hearings.
Public-hearing participants were asked to provide testimony
related to their experiences, perceptions, and concerns with
racial and/or ethnic bias or discrimination in Nebraska’s court
system. Participants were also encouraged to suggest recommendations for correcting racial and/or ethnic bias or discrimination in Nebraska’s court system.7
Persons not willing to make public statements were encouraged to give private, one-on-one testimony, also provided for at
each public hearing site. In addition to verbal testimony, written testimony also was solicited. The task force publicized the
opportunity to submit written testimony in mainstream and
nontraditional publications as well as noting it in the promotional campaign for each public hearing.
I. THE CONCERNS OF MINORITY RESIDENTS IN
NEBRASKA

Several issues emerged as significant concerns across all
nonwhite racial and ethnic groups. These concerns are differential sentencing and acquiring quality legal services. Other
issues were of concern only to specific minority groups.
CONSISTENT CONCERNS OF NONWHITES
Differential Sentencing
One of the dominant themes to emerge from the public
hearings was the perception that minorities receive harsher
sentences than whites. This belief was held for all sorts of decisions made in the legal process, including the decision to prosecute, the setting of bail/bonds, length of sentence, and so on.
One woman from eastern Nebraska described her observations
this way:
When I sit through criminal trials—and I started
when I was in college and I continually do it—do you
want to know who is prosecuted, who gets bail, who is
convicted and how long the sentence is? Each one of
you know that. You know that it’s the people of color
who receive the longest sentence, most likely to be convicted, either get excessive bail or no bail, because half
the time they’re not able to make it, and who are prosecuted.
Some participants believed that differential treatment initially
occurs when charges are filed (prosecutorial discretion). For
example, several respondents reported the perception that due to
the vagueness of the habitual criminal charge this charge is arbitrarily used against minorities. Similarly, one Nebraskan also
described how the second-degree murder statute is misused:
The law allows an arbitrary choice between conviction
for the crime of second-degree murder and manslaugh-

ter upon a sudden quarrel….The effect this problem has is to arbitrarily
choose between convicting someone for seconddegree murder or only for
manslaughter. It is possible for the authorities to
choose to prosecute and
convict minorities of second-degree murder (with
its greater punishment)
and prosecute and convict non-minorities only
of manslaughter.

One of the
dominant themes
to emerge from the
public hearings
was the perception
that minorities
receive harsher
sentences than
whites.

It is statements such as these that suggest that prosecutorial
discretion is perceived as a mechanism of discriminatory treatment.
According to testimony, differential treatment also plays out
in the setting of bail and/or bond. Several participants believed
that judges give larger bonds to minorities than they do whites:
One of the things that I’m really concerned with here
in Hall County is bonds and bails with the court system.
It seems that frequently Latinos will get picked up for
crimes—and I’m not making excuses for anybody’s
crimes or trying to stand up for those in that way. But
it just seems that often people are getting bonded out or
bailed out of jail with really excessive, excessively high
bails. And comparing it to crimes that are committed by
Anglos that live in the community and the bonds are
much, much less.
Additionally, differential sentencing was also a primary concern across nonwhite racial and ethnic groups. To one man
from Omaha, differential sentencing was evident not by examining specific cases but by the disparate incarceration of individuals of color:
There are two types of profiling: Police and judicial.
Well, how can there be—what is it now—about 70 percent, of the African-American population at the penitentiary in Nebraska? About 75 percent in Douglas County.
Now, isn’t it strange that you have, for a state with less
than 4 percent [black] population, but in the penitentiary, 65 to 70 percent. Now, are we to believe that
African-Americans are that bad in Nebraska? I don’t
think so. I think that’s why we are hearing that the court
system would have that one person commits a crime, is
African-American, gets a sentence, the white person
doesn’t.
There was also a specific concern with differential outcomes
in juvenile court. Differential sentencing at this age has the
potential to profoundly impact juveniles by establishing a crim-

7. Spanish language interpreters were available at each public hearing so that testimony in both Spanish and English could be
obtained.
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inal record that will follow
them into adulthood. This is
especially the case for juveniles
tried in adult court, one citizen
argued:
Juveniles
of
AfroAmerican or Hispanic,
Latino are more apt to be
sent to a correctional facility
than any white youth. And
you can take two cases, and the same situation, and you
can know which one is going and which one is staying
because this one will need—“Let’s give him some assistance, let’s give him some inpatient care, let’s do this.”
When you have cases which is determined should it be
as a juvenile or an adult, as many as 99.9 percent of the
time, if it is a young person of color, you know how they
are going to be judged, in the adult court.

received many comments voicing minority-group dissatisfaction with public defender services:
I have been to many, many people who have publicappointed attorneys, and almost 90 percent walk away
feeling that they have not been served. We have a problem in terms of feeling that we are being treated justly.

Legal Services
A second dominant theme to emerge from public-hearing
testimony was dissatisfaction with legal services. Issues of concern included the availability of low-income services; the
reliance on public defender services; and dissatisfaction with
the plea-bargaining system.
Testimony suggests that there are not sufficient resources in
Nebraska to provide legal aid to low-income individuals. A
representative of Nebraska Legal Services8 described the lack of
available legal help for low-income groups:
At Legal Services I spend most of my time telling
people, no, I’m sorry, I can’t help you. We’ve just
become this huge rejection line. And that’s because we
have the funding and the staff and the resources to
serve about 15 percent of the need. So I spend my time
turning 85 people out of a hundred away who all have
legitimate legal problems where a remedy at law or in
equity exists for them but there’s just no time, no
money, not enough money to represent them. And
when that number of people get turned away they have
two choices, you know, they can just do nothing or
they can try to defend themselves. If they do nothing,
what happens generally is people become very hopeless
and they give up on the system and huge amounts of
potential are lost. If they try to represent themselves,
you’re going to see frustration . . . because they can’t do
it. They just don’t have the training, the experience,
the ability to do it themselves.

Several minorities of limited income relayed their specific
dealings with court-appointed counsel. They believed that
their court-appointed counsel did not work for their best interest or care about their case outcomes:
She assured me that if I pleaded guilty to two zero-tofive [year] felonies and eight zero-to-one [year] misdemeanors that I would receive no more than four to eight
years due to the fact that they were not violent crimes.
Well, on sentencing day I received 20 months to five
years on each felony and six months to a year on each
misdemeanor, all to be ran consecutive to one another.
When I looked at my attorney she didn’t look one bit
surprised and packed up her briefcase and left without
saying one word to me. I know that if I had money to
obtain a prestigious lawyer I wouldn’t have received that
sort of sentence and if I was white I would not have
received that sort of sentence.

A second
dominant
theme . . . was
dissatisfaction
with legal
services.

Cost appears to be a significant barrier to gaining access to
legal representation. For instance, many participants hold the
perception that quality legal services are directly affected by
one’s ability to pay. So, when arrested and charged in a criminal matter, many low-income minorities must rely on the services of public defenders. Unfortunately, the task force

8. Nebraska Legal Services (NLS) is a nonprofit organization that
provides free civil legal assistance to low-income Nebraskans.
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An individual from eastern Nebraska elaborates on this sentiment toward public defenders:
I have sat through those court trials and I have seen
our county prosecutor go up and make their comments,
and a defending public defender, which, when it comes
to people of color . . . it is so poor that they should be
ashamed to even call it defending. You have inadequacy,
you have those who have no compassion, and their purpose is—and I have heard them say, “He’s guilty,” and
you are talking about the person you are supposed to be
defending.

Other individuals felt trapped by the insistence of lawyers to
plea-bargain rather than devote time to their case. There is a
general belief that the court is more concerned with closing
cases quickly than in the administration of justice.
Many recommendations to improve the situation were
offered. Solutions centered on increasing the amount of services available to low-income individuals. Participants suggested that this could be accomplished, in part by providing
public defenders and other attorneys who dedicate themselves
to a life of public service with competitive salary and retirement
benefits and a loan forgiveness program. Additionally, participants argued that resources should be made available to aid
individuals who choose to represent themselves pro se.
GROUP-SPECIFIC CONCERNS
A number of the themes emerged that were concerns specific
to certain racial and/or ethnic groups. It is likely that minority

NLS does not take criminal cases, so all references to NLS regard
civil remedies.

groups’ different views of the court system are based on groupspecific experiences. For instance, a dominant theme to emerge
from Latino/Latina populations was interpreter services. For
Native Americans, jurisdictional issues were of primary concern. In addition to an overwhelming amount of testimony concerning the police (which is beyond the scope of this project on
the courts), blacks were particularly concerned with the justice
system’s workforce being representative of the population (from
justice system employees to representative juries). Descriptions
of these group-specific concerns are revisited here.
Latinos/Latinas: Interpreter Services
Hispanics who took part in the public hearings expressed
great dissatisfaction with interpreter services in Nebraska,
including a lack of certified interpreters, the prevalence of misinterpretations, the lack of interpreter services both prior to
and following court appearances, how interpreter services are
compromised by an insistence on moving cases quickly, and a
general lack of knowledge about courts and legal proceedings
among new immigrants.
At present, there are only 11 certified court interpreters in
all of Nebraska, making it nearly impossible for courts to utilize certified court interpreters in all cases. When certified
interpreters are not available, respondents expressed concern
about the quality:
When I first came here, anybody could be an interpreter in the court, and many times the court didn’t
bother to get qualified people for the court. And anybody that could, just because they spoke a little
Spanish, was considered a competent translator or
interpreter. And many times none of these people had
any idea what they were doing.
It was not uncommon for people to report that children
were providing interpreter services. As a Macy resident
reported being told:
“I don’t care, bring your friend, your cousins. Don’t
your kids speak both languages? Bring one of them.”
Well, what if the child is eight years old? How many of
you would like to find yourself having violated a law in
another country and have your eight-year-old child
interpreting for you what’s going on?
Additionally, the lack of available interpreters for certain languages—combined with an increasing number of dialects being
spoken in the state—leads to situations in which more than one
interpreter is needed. Not only is this process time consuming,
it is likely that meaning is sometimes lost in translation:
I recently heard that in Hall County they needed—
they had to go find a person that spoke Mayan and
Spanish and then another person to speak Spanish and
English to relay the information. So [as] anyone . . .
who has worked with an interpreter or through an
interpreter [knows], it is very true when you hear that
something is lost in the translation.
Many incidences of incorrect translations were also reported
across multiple public-hearing sites. As an individual from

western Nebraska explained:
It was not
I think that judges and
uncommon for
all others involved in the
judicial process should be
people to report
more conscientious about
that children
this issue. I think that if
were providing
they were able to understand the interpreters and
interpreter
what they were saying
services.
they would be appalled. I
feel that if the transcribed
recordings were to be played back and a competent
interpreter were to listen to the interpretations he would
find a lot of shocking misinterpretations and misstatements and it just appears that people just don’t care.
Several individuals believed that courts simply were not
concerned with providing quality interpreter services. One
court interpreter reported a particularly egregious situation:
And he [the judge] yelled at me right there in front of
the court and he said, “I don’t care if she doesn’t understand what’s going on. I don’t have time to piss around
with this.” That’s exactly how he said it. He said, “If she
doesn’t understand, that’s her problem. I need to move
my cases in a hurry.” And I remember that because I
was very upset, because that told me that the judge did
not care if this lady knew what was going to happen to
her or not, he just wanted to move the cases.
Native Americans: Jurisdiction over Sovereign Nations
Many Native American respondents were concerned about
cross-jurisdictional problems related to sovereign lands.
Nebraska has two sovereign territories in northeastern Nebraska
(as well as another in northwest Nebraska that, unfortunately,
was not visited in the public hearings). Citizens of these nations
argued that often law enforcement officers as well as the courts
use jurisdictional differences as reason to hold Native
Americans for charges unworthy of bond. One Native American
participant described the potential for conflict:
I am not sure about the judges. There has always
been a jurisdictional problem here in this county with
regards to who has jurisdiction over what area and
where, whether it be the county roads, whether it be
the state roads or whether it be private property or trust
land. I know there seems to be a big division on that
interpretation right now. Although it has not really
come to a head yet.
Jurisdictional issues have extended into the justice system,
creating barriers to access, particularly for Native Americans.
For example, jurisdictional disagreements have created situations where criminals go uncharged. Additionally, jurisdictional disagreements sometimes have impacted a prosecutor’s
willingness to proceed with charges even in the most severe situations.
Blacks: Representation in the System
A significant justice issue for blacks in Nebraska is their rep-
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resentation as court employees and legal professionals.
The lack of representation of
minorities as employees and
administrators of the justice
system leads to a perception of
injustice. As one AfricanAmerican woman who has
worked in the court system for
over thirty years explained:
People’s perceptions are
that when they go in to any system and they do not see
anybody that looks like them, and that’s whether they
are African American, Native American, Hispanic,
Latino, Asian, when they come in that system, if they
don’t see people that look like them administering those
systems, working in those systems, then I think the perception automatically [is] that they’re not going to get
fair treatment. But when people come in and they are
talking to me or they come into the office and they see
other people in that office that are people of color, I
think it kind of gives them a different notion, and so
then they’re at least more open to looking at their own
behavior, as opposed to where you come in or when you
come into a courtroom and when you don’t see anybody
else but whites in the system, and, I mean from the time
you walk in the door to the clerk’s office to the bankruptcy court to, you know, the judge’s office and everybody in there, and those people are making decisions,
well, it really for that person I think starts with their perception of am I getting a fair trial, am I getting a fair
shake? And how can I possibly because, you know, the
entire system’s already set up against me.

Several black
participants
expressed the
importance of
having black
judges in their
community . . . .

Explanations such as these emphasize the need for increasing the number of people of color working for the system both
as court employees and legal professionals. Several black participants expressed the importance of having black judges in
their community:
And for a number of years, I think we only had one,
which was Judge [name of Judge] for years and years,
and then she retired. A lot of people liked her, a lot of
people didn’t, but the fact that she was a sitting black
female judge was important to people.
Several participants explained that having a court system
with a workforce that is representative of the community is
important not only for the perception of justice but because a
diverse workforce is likely to be a more accepting community,
sensitive to racial and ethnic issues and the unrecognized
biases of those in the majority.
To achieve a more diversified legal profession and court system participants advocated unbiased recruitment procedures,
not preferential treatment:
And I’m not just saying, hire an attorney because
they are of color, I’m saying hire attorneys of quality.
But judge them, when you look at them and say, do they
meet your standards, judge them on the same basis that
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you judge you. That’s what you ought to be looking at.
Those are the changes and they should be mandated.
II. A WORD ABOUT METHODS

Before concluding with a discussion of the policy implications of comments made by minorities in Nebraska, I will
review the process through which the underlying data was collected. Those more interested in conclusions than methodology can skip ahead to the next section.
Participants
Approximately 175 people gave public testimony and 25
attendees provided private testimony at a public-hearing site.
Several tactics were employed to publicize the public hearings
in an attempt to attract target populations (racial and ethnic
minorities). First, press releases (in English and Spanish) were
sent to city newspapers as well as radio and television stations
in each region where a hearing was planned. Several news outlets held interviews with task force representatives to discuss
the mission of the hearings and explain the logistics for testifying. The task force also sent invitations to community leaders
and relevant groups throughout the state in an attempt to
inform the largest possible constituency about each upcoming
hearing. This list included all district and county court
employees, members of the Nebraska State Bar Association and
the Midlands Bar Association, Nebraska Legal Services
Corporation, Nebraska Appleseed Center for Law and the
Public, the Nebraska state senators, city council members, university groups and professors, members of the business community (including Hispanic and black business owners), clergy
of minority-populated churches, local NAACP chapters, the
Urban League of Nebraska, the Mexican American
Commission, the Commission on Indian Affairs, and local
chambers of commerce, among others.
Hearing Locations
Public hearing sites were selected based on the size and
diversity of the population (see Table 1). The state’s most populated city, Omaha, was site to three public hearings at three
separate locations over a 75-day period. One hearing was held
in both Lincoln and Grand Island, the state’s second and fourth
TABLE 1: HEARING SITES AND PERCENTAGE MINORITY

City

Total
Population

Minority
Population

Percentage
Minority

Omaha

390,007

96,131

24.7%

Lincoln

225,581

127,494

12.2%

Grand Island

42,940

8,980

18.6%

Scottsbluff

14,732

4,184

28.4%

Lexington

10,001

5,394

53.9%

Macy

956

942

98.5%

most populated cities. Scottsbluff, Lexington, and Macy were
selected for their racial and ethnic diversity and their location
in the state.

Public perception of the courts is important.10 It affects both
the actual work of the court and the perceptions of those within
and outside the court. Existing research documents that racial
and ethnic minority groups in the United States hold more negative perceptions of the justice system.11 This research explores
the root of these perceptions qualitatively through public-hearing testimony, where individuals of varying minority status
were given the opportunity to explain their experiences and
perceptions of the courts.
Minority group members discussed a number of topics relative to the courts, most notably their perceptions of differential sentencing, on the disproportionate number of incarcerated
minorities within the state, differential treatment in terms of
prosecutorial discretion, bail/bond amounts, being tried in
juvenile vs. adult court, and actual sentences imposed by
judges. Many minority-group members also commented on the
issue of obtaining adequate legal services.
Further analysis reveals that many of the perceptions discussed here may be based on group-specific experiences and are
not necessarily similar across groups. For instance, the
Hispanic population in Nebraska was primarily concerned with
the availability and quality of interpreter services. Native
Americans’ perceptions, on the other hand, centered on jurisdictional issues, and blacks were particularly concerned with
issues of representation within the system (as employees,
lawyers, judges, etc). Since research suggests that individuals’
evaluations of the courts are affected by their personal experiences with the courts,12 it seems less likely that the concerns
identified in this article would even be identified as problematic
by a white sample. In other words, whites do not face the same
language, jurisdictional, or representational issues that

Hispanics, Native Americans,
[T]he Hispanic
and blacks face in the state
population in
courts.
These findings have several
Nebraska was
policy implications.
First,
primarily
efforts to improve minority’s
concerned with
perceptions of racial and ethnic
bias in the court system should
the availability
be centered on the issues that
and quality of
they have identified as probleminterpreter
atic. In other words, efforts
services.
should focus on the concerns of
communities of color, rather
than solely rely on the perceptions of fairness held by whites
(which may be the concerns reflected in overall opinion surveys, given whites’ numerical majority in quantitative samples). More specifically, to improve Hispanic’s perceptions of
fairness in the court system, efforts should be made to address
the inadequacies in interpreter services. Similarly, working to
solve jurisdictional issues and making court systems more representative of their respective communities will improve the
perception of procedural and symbolic justice.
Second, this article demonstrates the utility of public hearings as a research method. Public forums are often held on
local and state issues, but remain an untapped source of rich
qualitative data. In researching concerns of racial and ethnic
bias, public hearings serve as a valuable tool—one that can differentiate the real and complex issues between states or jurisdictions, issues that are often not brought to light through
quantitative instruments. At the same time, these forums may
provide participants with an outlet and a sense of agency.
There are several limitations to this study. First, there
appears to be a lack of representation from the Asian community in the public hearings. According to the 2000 U.S. Census
Bureau figures, 1.3% of Nebraska’s population is Asian.
However, very few public-hearing participants identified themselves as Asian. Additionally, with the exception of needing
interpreter services for an increasing Asian population, no specific concerns regarding the Asian community were expressed.
It is not the intent of this article to ignore this population or
suggest that their concerns with the legal system are nonexistent or of less importance. Future research should attempt to
specifically gather data from this population.
Second, several public-hearing participants stated that some
hesitation within the community was held concerning testifying at the public hearings. This hesitation stemmed from a fear
of backlash—that judges, lawyers, police officers, and/or other
court employees would find out who said what at the hearing
and take action against those who spoke against them or their
practices.
Finally, since this data was collected in a public-hearing setting, it is certainly possible that the positions of those responding are not representative of the public’s opinions or even those

9. The majority of these contributions were related to law enforcement. Research indicates that individuals often interpret “legal
system” as including law enforcement. See Brooks & JeonSlaughter, supra note 6.

10. See Benesh & Howell, supra note 1; Flanagan, et al., supra note 1;
Caldeira, supra note 3; and Tyler, supra note 3.
11. See sources cited and discussed in note 6, supra.
12. See Tyler, supra note 6

In order to create a comfortable and non-threatening atmosphere, great care was taken to hold the public hearings at sites
within the cities that were considered “friendly” to minority
populations. For example, minority-dominated schools,
churches, and community centers were used at all eight sites.
Data Collection
Hearings were transcribed verbatim by professional court
reporters and carefully read by the author for a full comprehension of the content. Cross-case thematic analysis was used
to identify themes across hearings and racial groups. Although
participants were asked to provide testimony concerning their
experiences and perceptions of racial and ethnic bias in the
court system, several participants made contributions outside
the scope of the project.9 Testaments such as these were not
included for analysis.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND STUDY LIMITATIONS
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of the specific racial or ethnic group of the respondent. This in
no way affects the overall point of the study however, which is
to illustrate how the one-dimensional picture of racial and ethnic dissatisfaction with the courts can be illuminated through
an analysis of those participants suitably upset and/or motivated to give public testimony. It is unlikely that the concerns
of these minority communities could have been as thoroughly
expressed using a quantitative instrument.
In conclusion, this research supplements much of what is
commonly inferred from court-related surveys of public trust
and confidence. By attempting to demonstrate the basis for
these differing attitudes through an analysis of public hearing
testimony, this project illustrates the deep-seeded distrust of
the courts held by many minority group members. It also
demonstrates that what might appear monolithic in its dissatisfaction is actually contextual in nature. While blacks,
Hispanics, and Native Americans may have some shared concerns and a shared lack of trust in the legal system, there are
significantly different attitudes that underlie these feeling of
dissatisfaction for each group.

Elizabeth Neeley is a project director at the
University of Nebraska Public Policy Center for
its Minority and Justice Implementation
Committee. She has worked on several additional Public Policy Center projects, most
notably the Minority and Justice Task Force and
the Lancaster County Indigency Screener
Evaluation. She will graduate in August 2004
with a Ph.D. in sociology from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln.
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How Useful Is the New
Aggressive Driving Legislation?
Victor E. Flango and Ann L. Keith

“‘Police chase’ took on a new meaning when a motorist angry about getting a speeding ticket decided to go after
the officer who issued the citation, slamming her car into his cruiser several times.”1
“Someone cut in front of someone else. Drivers exchanged ugly words. One of them hurled a bologna sandwich.
Then a shot rang out.”2

A

ggressive driving usually refers to a disregard for others
on the road and is distinguished from the more extreme
“road rage,” which involves violent, criminal acts.
Nevertheless, with an 1,800 reported incidents of violent road
behavior involving the use of an automobile in the United
States in 1996, it is a national problem requiring attention.
Aggressive driving is responsible for more than 27,000 fatalities
per year as well as over 3,000,000 injuries, costing over $150
billion dollars.3
A survey of 6,000 drivers by the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA) found that 60% of the drivers
interviewed believed that unsafe driving by others is a major
personal threat to them and their families.4 A December 2,
2003 AAA survey found aggressive driving to be the top threat
on Washington, D.C. area roads. Forty-three percent of the
respondents said that aggressive driving was more of a danger
than traffic congestion and road conditions, and even impaired
driving.5 Moreover, AAA notes that aggressive driving has been
increasing 7% per year since 1990.6
The incidents that trigger aggressive driving in the average
driver are usually simple matters of discourtesy—hand and
facial gestures, loud music, overuse of the horn, tailgating,
speeding, and failure to signal when changing lanes. These driving behaviors are just the trigger points, while the actual
causes of aggressive driving can be traced back to all forms of
stress in an individual’s daily life. “Road warriors” are the result

of a flashpoint of all the accumulated stresses in life.7 Like driving under the influence, aggressive driving is not a simple
action, but a behavioral choice drivers make.
NHTSA defines aggressive driving as follows: “when individuals commit a combination of many traffic offenses as to
endanger persons or property.” A more specific definition is
“the operation of a motor vehicle involving three or more moving violations as part of a single, continuous sequence of driving
acts which is likely to endanger any person or property.”8 Driving
acts are ones you would expect: running stop signs, disobeying
red lights, speeding, tailgating, weaving in and out of traffic,
passing on the right, unsafe lane changes, going around railroad
gates, flashing lights and blowing horns, facial and hand gestures.
Although some states have enacted laws specifically directed
at aggressive driving, many do not distinguish aggressive driving from other traffic offenses. A national study of 2,858 cases
showed that exceeding the posted speed limit was the most frequently used indicator of aggressive driving cases (914) and
that improper lane changes (512) and driving too closely (233)
were other common offenses that indicated aggressive driving.

This article was adapted from a study done for the Virginia
Department of Motor Vehicles. The authors are grateful to Vincent
Burgess for his help and support, to our colleague Don Cullen for his
assistance on the project, to Neal Kauder for his graphics expertise,
and to Mary McFarland and Walter Latham for surveying the states.
Thanks to all of those who reviewed the drafts of the Virginia survey
questionnaires: Judge Thomas Kelly of Arlington; Colonel W. Steve
Flaherty, superintendent, Virginia State Police; Susan Williams, director of the Commonwealth’s Attorneys’ Services Council; Dana Schrad,
executive director of the Virginia Association of Chiefs of Police, and
Russell K. Cox, management analyst, Virginia State Police.

Footnotes
1. Angry Motorist Slams Car Into Cruiser, Associated Press,
November 7, 2003 (filed at 11:55 a.m. ET).
2. David Chernicky, A Tale of Road Rage, Bologna and Bullet, DAILY
PRESS (Newport News, Va.), May 2, 2002.
3. American Institute for Public Safety, Aggressive Driving and the
Law, PowerPoint presentation, Aggressive Driving and the Law
Symposium, Miami, December 2000. Data are from 1999.
4. NHTSA, AGGRESSIVE DRIVING ENFORCEMENT: STRATEGIES FOR
IMPLEMENTING BEST PRACTICES, 4 (2000).
5. AAA, Aggressive Drivers Remain Top Threat, Mid-Atlantic news
release (December 2, 2003). See www.aaamidatlantic.com.
6. Mark Pepper, More about Road Rage, U.S. NEWS WORLD REP. (June
1997).
7. Id.
8. NHTSA, supra. note 4, at 6 (emphasis added).
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A SURVEY OF STATES THAT HAVE AGGRESSIVE
DRIVING LAWS

What is the experience of states that have aggressive driving
laws? This question was posed to place Virginia’s experience in

FIGURE 1: COMPARISON OF AGGRESSIVE DRIVING STATUTES BY STATE.
Year
Enacted

Penalty

Is Anger Management or Aggressive
Driving Education Specifically Stated
in the Statute?

Additional Penalties Specific to Aggressive
Driving Conviction

Other Information

Arizona

1999

Class 1 Misdemeanor punish- Yes. Mandatory traffic school and
1st Offense: traffic school and possible
able by up to 6 months in jail, education sessions may be ordered. suspension of driver’s license for 30 days.
a fine up to $5,000, or both.
2nd Offense: within 24 months results in
1-year license revocation.

California

2000

Punishable by not less than 5 Yes. Anger management or road
days in a county jail nor more rage courses may be ordered.
than 90 days or a fine of not
less than $145 nor more than
$1,000.

Delaware

1999

Fine $100-$300 or jail 10-30
days or both.

Yes. Mandatory anger management 1st Offense: $100-$300 fine or jail 10-30
course is ordered.
days or both. 2nd Offense: within 36
months results in $300-$1,000 fine or jail
30-60 days or both. Mandatory suspension of driver’s license for 30 days.

Suspended sentences are not permitted for aggressive driving violations.

Florida

2001

None

No

No

The designation of aggressive
careless driving does not create a
new violation or offense. The purpose of the designation is to provide a method to collect data of
such instances that might arise
through the inclusion of a checkbox on uniform traffic citations

Georgia

2001

Points are assessed against
driving record.

Yes. Anger management course
may be ordered.

If assessed points meet prescribed levels, Penalties are based upon cumulasuspension of driver’s license is ordered. tive points assessed against driving record.

Maryland

2001

Fine not exceeding $500.

No

5-point penalty on driver's license.

Nevada

1999

Misdemeanor

Yes. Traffic safety course is
ordered.

1st Offense: Traffic safety course and possible suspension of driver’s license for <
30 days. 2nd Offense: within 24 months,
revocation of driver’s license for 1 year.

Rhode
Island

2000

Fine not less than $20 nor
more than $500.

Yes. Anger management course
may be ordered.

Possible suspension of driver’s license for
30 days.

Virginia

2002

Class 2 Misdemeanor punish- Yes. Anger management course
able by up to 6 months in jail, may be ordered.
a fine up to $1,000, or both.

context. Virginia’s law went into effect July 1, 2002, making it
the eighth state to enact a law against aggressive driving. Figure
1 summarizes the aggressive driving legislation in each state.
(Statutory citations are detailed in Appendix A.)
Aggressive driving laws in Florida, Maryland, Nevada, and
Rhode Island are described below.

Reckless driving is a Class 2
Misdemeanor punishable by up to
4 months in jail, a fine up to $750,
or both.

1st Offense: 6-month suspension of driRoad Rage (or aggressive driving)
ver’s license and/or anger management or is part of the reckless driving
road rage course. 2nd Offense: 12-month statute.
suspension of driver’s license and/or
anger management or road rage course.

1st Offense: Anger management course
may be ordered.

RECKLESS DRIVING
January 2002 –
December 2002

Aggressive driving with the intent
to injure another person is a Class
1 Misdemeanor. Reckless driving
is a Class 2 Misdemeanor.

AGGRESSIVE DRIVING
October 2002 –
September 2003

13,589*

8,335

*NOTE: Includes both reckless and DWI.

Florida
Florida has two applicable statutes: reckless driving and
aggressive careless driving. The reckless driving statute requires
intent be proven. The aggressive careless driving statute
requires only that the offender to be guilty of “two or more of
the following acts simultaneously or in succession”: exceeding
the posted speed; unsafely or improperly changing lanes; following another vehicle too closely; failing to yield the right-ofway; improperly passing; or violating traffic control and signal
devices. Note the following citation statistics for Florida (note
the different time periods):

The Florida contact indicated that the Florida Highway
Patrol’s policy is to cite the most serious offense. Reckless driving is the more serious offense because the only ramification
of aggressive driving is that the officer checks off a box on the
citation indicating that the driver has met the statutory definition of “aggressive driving.” Aggressive driving is not a punishable offense under Florida law. In 2001 the Florida legislature passed a new designation “Aggressive Careless Driving,”
but this offense is a designation of existing offenses as constituting Aggressive Careless Driving and is used only to collect
data on the number of such instances that might arise through
the inclusion of a checkbox on Uniform Traffic Citations. 9

9. William P. Cervone, State Attorney’s Office, LEGAL BULL. 2002-2003
(Eighth Judicial Circuit), 1 (July 2002).
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Maryland
Reckless driving citations are clearly more frequent than
aggressive driving citations in Maryland. Aggressive driving is
much more difficult to prove because three violations must
occur consecutively. The fine for reckless driving also is much
higher ($575) than the fine for aggressive driving ($355). Law
enforcement respondents reported that the distinction between
the two laws was clear, but that aggressive driving was rarely
used because of the difficulty in prosecuting those cases. Law
enforcement informants also believed that behavior at the stop
did not affect the charge, as the offense was clear before the stop
was made. From the court’s perspective, aggressive driving citations have rarely been seen, and the differences between reckless and aggressive driving were not clear. Nonetheless, the
court contact felt confident that police officers would be clear
on the details of the law. He felt, as far as reckless driving citations go, that there were plenty of sentencing options, although
fines were the most common. Only in cases involving younger
drivers were driver improvement classes and treatment programs used to any extent. None of the contacts had any information on recidivism.
Nevada
As in Maryland, aggressive driving offenses are cited much
less frequently in Nevada than reckless driving offenses. In the
Reno Municipal Court, from the enactment of the law in 1999
until November 2003, there have been four aggressive driving
charges initially filed, but only one has resulted in a final charge
of aggressive driving. Prosecutor contacts suggested that
because of evidentiary problems and the technical nature in
proving aggressive driving beyond a reasonable doubt, aggressive driving charges are often plea-bargained or reduced. In the
same court, over the same period of time, there have been 621
initial reckless driving charges and 213 reckless driving final
charges. The number of reckless driving charges grew from 19
in 2000, to 211 in 2001, and to 224 in 2002, but dropped to 167
in 2003. Both prosecutors and law enforcement reported that
the distinction between aggressive and reckless driving laws
was clear, and prosecutors found the Nevada Highway Patrol to
be very thorough when it made attempts to cite aggressive driving over reckless driving. Aggressive driving can have a
greater penalty than reckless driving, in that the driver’s license
can be suspended. If the experience of the Reno Municipal
Court is representative of other Nevada counties, then aggressive driving is hardly ever used, and the charge is amended
down over half the time.
Rhode Island
The aggressive driving law in Rhode Island went into effect
in August 2000. The Rhode Island Training Academy is responsible for instructing law enforcement officers. Training academies are held every four years. The aggressive driving statute
will be covered at the next session of the training academy,
scheduled for August 2004. Since the law was enacted in 2000
until November 6, 2003, there have been 52 aggressive driving

10. Governor Makes Law “Aggressive Driving” Bill, DAILY PRESS
(Newport News, Va.), April 8, 2002.
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convictions. In the same time period, there have been 222 reckless driving convictions. Law enforcement believed that one
citation was not necessarily more difficult to prove than the
other. All were clear on the distinction between reckless and
aggressive driving, and noted that intent is not needed to convict on aggressive driving. Most contacts replied that the law
was effective to the extent it was used, but it is used infrequently.
One law enforcement contact had only written two or three
citations since the law was enacted, but believed that citations
for aggressive driving were just as easy to write and prove as
those for reckless driving. Aggressive driving in Rhode Island
requires excessive speeding or two other violations in sequence
(e.g., tailgating, rapid lane changes, etc.) and is a summons
offense, whereas reckless driving is a misdemeanor. Officers
said behavior at a stop could be taken into account, but it was
at the officer’s discretion. Where it is possible, police would
prefer to cite reckless driving because it carries a greater penalty.
SUMMARY OF STATE SURVEY

Four of the seven states with aggressive driving laws (not
counting Virginia) were asked about their experience with that
legislation. Aggressive driving is not cited frequently in three of
the four states. Law enforcement officers prefer to cite reckless
driving when it is an option because it carries a greater penalty.
Although the remaining state, Florida, has a significant number
of aggressive driving violations, the violations do not carry a
separate penalty.
AGGRESSIVE DRIVING IN VIRGINIA

On April 7, 2002, the governor of Virginia approved legislation that makes aggressive driving punishable by up to six
months in jail, a fine up to $1,000, or both.10 Virginia is the
first state that empowers judges to order violators to take a
course in anger management. The governor also approved legislation to establish a driver improvement clinic program.
Section 46.2-490 provides for a curriculum, which includes
instruction on alcohol and drug abuse, aggressive driving, distracted driving, and motorcycle awareness. According to the
legislation, approved on March 22, 2002,
the driver improvement clinic program shall be
established for the purpose of instructing persons
identified by the Department and the court system as
problem drivers in need of driver improvement education and training and for those drivers interested
in improving driving safety.
The National Center for State Courts (NCSC) proposed to
evaluate aggressive driving programs in Virginia to determine
which are most effective in reducing recidivism. The goal of
these programs is to help traffic offenders avoid aggressive driving tactics by managing their own angry behavior behind the
wheel.
After more than a year of study, and several site visits dis-

cussing the issue with judges, commonwealth’s attorneys, and
law enforcement, NCSC project staff found aggressive driving
was simply not being charged as an offense by law enforcement
and commonwealth’s attorneys, and consequently, cases were
not being filed in courts or referred by courts for services.
Under those circumstances, evaluation of anger management
and other treatment alternatives was not possible.
Anecdotal evidence from many interviews conducted
throughout Virginia led project staff to reach tentative conclusions. First, police officials regard aggressive driving as more
egregious than reckless driving (although the statute defines
aggressive driving as an intermediate offense—i.e., an offense
less severe than reckless driving but more severe than many
traffic offenses). Second, because there were comparatively few
cases being cited by law enforcement and prosecuted by the
commonwealth’s attorneys, few aggressive driving cases were
filed in court. As a result, there was no incentive to modify
existing treatment programs or to create new ones.
THE SURVEY

Draft questionnaires were written for law enforcement, prosecutors, and district judges to solicit their perspectives on the
current operation of the aggressive driving statute, as well as
any suggestions for changes.
The law enforcement questionnaire was drafted in June 2003
and sent to the Department of Motor Vehicles and several police
associations for review. Law enforcement questionnaires were
prepared so they could be completed in electronic form. Three
hundred ninety usable responses were received.
The questionnaire for the commonwealth’s attorneys was
received by the director of the Commonwealth’s Attorneys’
Services Council, and 32 commonwealth’s attorneys responded.
A similar questionnaire for district judges was drafted and
revised based on comments from the Virginia Department of
Motor Vehicles and a district judge. This questionnaire was distributed to district judges at the 2003 Judicial Transportation
Safety Conference held August 13-14, 2003, and 42 judges
responded.11
HOW OFTEN ARE AGGRESSIVE DRIVING LAWS USED IN
VIRGINIA?

The first question on all three surveys was designed to determine the frequency of use of aggressive driving laws.
Ninety-six percent of the law enforcement officers who completed the questionnaire said they rarely or never wrote a citation for aggressive driving. Only 3% said they “often cite an
offender for aggressive driving.” Similarly, 56% of the prosecutors said they have never charged a person with an aggressive
driving violation, and 36% said they do so only rarely. Thirtyone percent of judges have never heard an aggressive driving
case, and another 67% heard them only rarely.

FIGURE 2: HOW OFTEN ARE AGGRESSIVE DRIVING
LAWS USED?
Law Enforcement Officers (written a citation)
Never

84.5%

Yes, rarely
Yes, often

12.0%
3.1%

Prosecutors (charged a case)
Never

56%

Yes, rarely
Yes, often

36%
6%

Judges (presided over a case)
Never

31.0%

Yes, rarely
Yes, often

66.7%
2.4%

1. Law Enforcement
Figure 3 shows the reckless or aggressive driving citation
options used by law enforcement officers.
Law enforcement officers were asked, “In approximately
what percentage of the traffic violations do you have the option
of citing either reckless driving or aggressive driving?” Nearly
half (48.5 percent) said that it was rare (less than 5 percent)
that an incident afforded them the option to cite either reckless
driving or aggressive driving. A small percentage of the officers
(7 percent), however, believed that they could have written
either offense in half of the incidents. Given the choice, where
such an option was legitimate, 74 percent of the law enforcement officers who responded to the survey said they would
write the ticket for reckless driving, as opposed to 22 percent
who would choose the aggressive driving offense. Of the other
legitimate options, “improper driving” was the most frequent
choice listed.
Most law enforcement officers (70 percent) said that the
behavior of the driver at the scene did not affect their decision
to cite for either reckless driving or aggressive driving, but a significant proportion (28 percent) said that driver behavior did
influence their decision. For the primary reasons police do not
cite vehicle operators for aggressive driving, see Figure 4.

11. Judges who attended the traffic safety conference may be more
interested in traffic cases than other judges.
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FIGURE 3: RECKLESS DRIVING LAWS IN VIRGINIA
Source: VCC Codes (reckless.doc)
Misdemeanor
Offense Class

Aggressive Driving
Aggressive driving
Aggressive driving with intent to injure
Pass
Emergency vehicle, overtake or pass
Pass at railway crossing or intersection
Pass two vehicles abreast
Pass without visibility
Police Command, Disregard
Disregard police command to stop, endangerment
Fail to stop for police, attempt to escape or elude
Racing
Racing
Racing, aiding or abetting
School Bus
School bus flashing lights, fail to stop for
Speeding
20 MPH or more over speed limit-limit is 30 MPH or less
20 MPH or more over speed limit-limit is 40 MPH or more
60 MPH or more when limit is 35 MPH
Speed, truck-exceed 65 MPH on two-lane highway
Speed over 80 MPH
Speed unreasonable for conditions
Other
Control, load or passengers interfere with
Endanger life or limb
Enter highway, fail to yield right of way
Fail to yield right of way, sign posted
Out of control or bad brakes
Parking lots, drive in endangering life or limb
Riding abreast in one lane
Signal turn or stop, fail to

Penalty
(Y= Years)
(M = Months)

Statute

Class 2
Class 1

46.2-868.1 §
46.2-868.1 §

0-6M
0-12M

Class 1
Class 1
Class 1
Class 1

46.2-829§
46.2-858§
46.2-856§
46.2-854§

0-12M
0-12M
0-12M
0-12M

Felony 6
Class 3

46.2-817(B)§
46.2-817(A)§

1Y-5Y
Fine

Class 1
Class 1

46.2-865§
46.2-866§

0-12M
0-12M

Class 1

46.2-859§

0-12M

Class 1
Class 1
Class 1
Class 1
Class 1
Class 1

46.2-862(i)§
46.2-862(iii) §
46.2-862(ii)§
46.2-862§
46.2-862(iv)§
46.2-861§

0-12M
0-12M
0-12M
0-12M
0-12M
0-12M

Class 1
Class 1
Class 1
Class 1
Class 1
Class 1
Class 1
Class 1

46.2-855§
46.2-852§
46.2-863§
46.2-863§
46.2-853§
46.2-864§
46.2-857§
46.2-860§

0-12M
0-12M
0-12M
0-12M
0-12M
0-12M
0-12M
0-12M

Note: Misdemeanors also carry a monetary penalty.

FIGURE 4: WHY DO LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS NOT CITE VEHICLE OPERATORS FOR AGGRESSIVE DRIVING?

Reckless driving is easier to prove
Difference from reckless not clear
Reckless driving is sufficient
Aggressive penalty not as harsh
Aggressive should be lesser offense
Reckless is more severe penalty
0
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Percentage
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FIGURE 5: WHY DO PROSECUTORS NOT CHARGE VEHICLE OPERATORS FOR AGGRESSIVE DRIVING?

Reckless driving is easier to prove
Difference from reckless not clear
Reckless driving is sufficient
Aggressive penalty not as harsh
Aggressive should be lesser offense
Reckless is more severe penalty
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FIGURE 6: WHY DO JUDGES NOT CONVICT VEHICLE OPERATORS FOR AGGRESSIVE DRIVING?

Reckless driving is easier to prove
Difference from reckless not clear
Reckless driving is sufficient
Aggressive penalty not as harsh
Aggressive should be lesser offense
Reckless is more severe penalty
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2. Prosecutors
When presented with a similar option for the charging decision, an even stronger majority (65%) of the commonwealth’s
attorneys said that rarely (less than 5% of the time) do they
choose aggressive driving when reckless driving is an alternative. If they did have a legitimate choice of charges, 56% of the
prosecutors would prefer to charge reckless driving, compared
to the 32% who would prefer aggressive driving. Driver behavior has more of an influence on the prosecutor’s than on the law
enforcement officer’s decision. More than half (55%) of the
commonwealth’s attorneys who responded to the survey said
that the driver’s behavior does affect their decision on which
offense to charge, and 45% said it did not.
For the commonwealth’s attorney’s primary reasons for not
charging drivers for aggressive driving, see Figure 5.
3. Judges
The majority of district court judges (57%) said that aggressive driving was a viable alternative in less than 5% of reckless
driving cases that came before them. Many of the judges did
not answer the question of how often an aggressive driving
conviction is a viable alternative to a reckless driving conviction, and those who did said that such convictions were rare
(see figure 6).

In summary, the fact that reckless driving is easier to prove
was the major reason law enforcement officers did not cite, prosecutors did not charge, or judges did not convict aggressive drivers. With one exception, a significant proportion (20% to 40%
percent) of all three types of groups reported that the difference
between reckless driving and aggressive driving was not clear
and that the reckless driving offense is sufficient. The exception
was district judges, of whom over 60% said a charge of reckless
driving was to be preferred to aggressive driving because it carries a more severe penalty.
WHAT CHANGES IN THE LAW OR PENALTY WOULD
INCREASE USE OF THE AGGRESSIVE DRIVING LAW?

With regard to law enforcement officers, 62% reported that
no changes could be made in the law that would cause them to
cite aggressive driving offenses more frequently. Fifteen percent
of the respondents said that they would be more likely to write
aggressive driving citations if the charge were pre-payable, thus
reducing the time law enforcement officers needed to spend in
court. Twenty-three percent of the respondents did suggest
some changes in the law. Most said “stiffer penalties,” but others said to make the offense easier to prove (remove the intent
provision) or the law clearer. Yet, a vast majority of the officers
(78%) said that even if the penalty for aggressive driving was
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more severe, they would not write more tickets. Several of the
officers said “anger management” classes were needed, and
some preferred that the classes be mandatory.
FIGURE 7: PERCENTAGE THAT INDICATED THAT NO
CHANGES COULD BE MADE TO INCREASE
THE USE OF THE AGGRESSIVE DRIVING LAW
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Like law enforcement officers, most prosecutors (58%) said
that neither changes in the law nor changes in the penalty
would cause them to charge aggressive driving more frequently.
About a quarter of the judges did not respond to this set of
questions, but the 28 judges who did said a change in law was
required if the aggressive driving statute was to be used more
often. An even higher proportion (79%) responded that
changes in penalty would not affect the use of aggressive driving laws. Most judges (71%) are satisfied with the sentencing
options available to them now and have not noticed any specific
penalties that reduce recidivism rates.
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE VIRGINIA SURVEYS

• The aggressive driving law is rarely used. Law enforcement
officers rarely, if ever, write tickets for aggressive driving;
prosecutors rarely charge the offense; and judges rarely see
these offenses in court.
• About half of the judges believed that reckless driving laws
were sufficient and that there was no need for specific
aggressive driving legislation. About a quarter of police officers agreed, but commonwealth’s attorneys were much more
likely to believe that the legislation was necessary.
• Most often the offense is clear, so the officer will cite either
reckless driving or aggressive driving; therefore, the commonwealth’s attorney does not often have to decide between
the two offenses. When the option is available, law enforcement and prosecutors both prefer to cite or charge reckless
driving. Aggressive driving requires a proof of intent that
reckless driving does not. About half of the police and prosecutors and three-quarters of the judges said reckless driving
is easier to prove than aggressive driving.
• Most law enforcement officers reported that the behavior of
the driver at the scene did not affect which offense was
charged, but prosecutors are much more affected in their
charging decision by the behavior of the driver at the scene.
• Overall, law enforcement officers did not believe that
changes in the law or in the penalty would result in them
writing more tickets for aggressive driving. Most commonwealth’s attorneys came to the same conclusion with respect
to charging.
• Overall, judges were satisfied with the sentencing alterna40 Court Review - Winter 2004

tives available, but more judges than law enforcement officers or prosecutors said a change in the aggressive driving
law, but not in the penalties, was needed. Most judges
believe that the reckless driving offense is sufficient and that
an aggressive driving law was not needed, although a strong
minority (21%) believed that aggressive driving should be a
lesser-included offense under reckless driving.
Aggressive driving legislation in Virginia was designed to be
an intermediate option for use when standards of proof for
reckless driving could not be achieved. In practice, aggressive
driving is often more difficult to prove than reckless driving is.
There are perhaps three reasons for this. The first is the need to
prove “intent” in aggressive driving cases, but not in reckless
driving cases. Furthermore, in the current legislation, aggressive driving has both a subjective and an objective component.
Reckless driving is easier to prove because the subjective element of “intent” is not part of the burden of proof.
Second, by its very nature, the definition of aggressive driving requires that a series of unsafe acts occur in a sequence,
consequently making aggressive driving more difficult to prove
than any single traffic violation. Finally, reckless driving carries
a more severe penalty. Given the choice among offenses, law
enforcement, prosecutors, victims, and the public would prefer
using charges of reckless driving to deal with serious traffic violations.
Given this situation, three legislative responses are possible:
1. Remove “intent” as an element of proof for aggressive
driving.
2. Propose more severe penalties for aggressive driving.
3. Add an “aggressive driving” tag to other traffic offenses
to permit enhancing the existing penalties and to track
the incidence of aggressive driving for statistical purposes that may lead to changes in legislation.
We did not recommend additional education and training of
law enforcement officers because most understand the difference between aggressive and reckless driving. The question is
what is the incentive to cite aggressive driving if reckless driving is an option? Reckless driving does not require proof of
intent and the penalties are more severe.
Because aggressive driving laws are a relatively new experiment in Virginia, as in all states, we recommended that the
experiment continue to unfold until Virginia and other states
obtain sufficient experience to determine with more certainty
what, if any, legislative changes are required. Many states are
struggling with the issue of aggressive driving, and there is an
opportunity for states to learn from each other the relative effectiveness of various aggressive driver programs in reducing the
incidence of aggressive driving.
The idea of employing anger management techniques to
reduce the incidence of aggressive driving remains promising.
However, until Virginia is able to identify a sufficient number of
aggressive drivers who may benefit from such treatment, an
assessment of the types of treatment that are most effective is
simply not possible. This is another reason to wait for the situation to “ripen” in Virginia, at which time the issue of anger
management treatment for aggressive driving should be
reopened.
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APPENDIX A: STATES WITH AGGRESSIVE DRIVING LEGISLATION, JULY 10, 2003.
Currently, eight states have enacted aggressive driving laws.*

Arizona

A.R.S.§ 28-695 (2003) Aggressive Driving; Violation; Classification; Definition

Delaware

21 Del. C. §4175A Aggressive Driving

Florida

Fla. Stat. § 316.1923 (2002) Aggressive Careless Driving;
Fla. Stat. § 316.650 (2002) Traffic Citations

Georgia

O.C.G.A. § 40-6-397 (2002) Aggressive Driving; Penalty
O.C.G.A. § 40-5-57 (2002) Suspension or Revocation of License of Habitually
Negligent or Dangerous Driver; Point System

Maryland

Md. TRANSPORTATION Code Ann. § 21-901.2 (2002) Aggressive Driving
Md. TRANSPORTATION Code Ann. § 16-402 (2002) Assessment of Points

Nevada

NRS § 484.3765 (2003) Aggressive Driving

Rhode Island

R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-27.1-3 (2002) Aggressive Driving Defined
R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-27.1-4 (2002) Penalties

Virginia

Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-868.1 (2003) Aggressive Driving; Penalties
Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-492 (2003) Uniform Demerit Point System

An additional 17 states have introduced aggressive driving bills from 1999 to 2003: Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois,
Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington.
*

New York enacted a “road rage” law in July 2002 that requires that pre-licensing and defensive driving courses to contain a component of road rage awareness education.
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SENTENCING AFTER BLAKELY
ANNE SKOVE, BLAKELY V. WASHINGTON:
IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE COURTS (2004).
Available at http://www.ncsconline.org/
WC/Publications/KIS_SentenBlakely.pdf
As many of you know, the U.S. Supreme
Court’s June decision in Blakely v.
Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), invalidated an upward sentence departure that
was based on the fact findings of a judge,
not a jury. Substantial questions have been
raised as to the impact of Blakely on sentencing guidelines and practices in state
and federal court.
Anne Skove, an attorney in the
Knowledge & Information Services section of the National Center for State
Courts, has prepared a detailed memorandum providing a preliminary appraisal of
questions raised by Blakely and its potential impact. The memo includes a stateby-state review of practices and a discussion of potential impacts on sentencing
guidelines, pleas, jury trials, and court
budgets.
Skove’s analysis will not be the last
word on this topic and she does not claim
otherwise. Everyone’s analysis is tentative
at this point. But she has provided a useful starting point for anyone beginning
their consideration of the impact of
Blakely. For some of the issues, she suggests that the answers are uncertain at
present, but suggests some ways in which
application of Blakely may play out. For
example, she reviews its potential impact
on probation and parole, including revocation hearings. She asks, “Are the factfinding processes in probation and parole
decisions similar enough to a presumptive
sentence to come under Blakely’s
purview?” Although no final answer is
given to that question, she reviews cases
and practices from around the states that
suggest potential answers. She also
reviews potential impacts on consideration of criminal history information,
mandatory minimum sentences, truth-in44 Court Review - Winter 2004

sentencing provisions, consecutive sentences, and due process notice issues.
Final sections include a review of solutions already in use around the country.
Kansas, for example, had already determined that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466 (2000), required jury findings for
upward sentencing departures and provided for bifurcated jury trials. Thus, jury
instructions for such a procedure already
exist in Kansas. Skove suggests that a new
statute may not be needed in many states
to allow bifurcated trials.
Other
options—rights waivers, making guidelines voluntary, and amending guidelines—are also discussed.
Skove’s memorandum provides a useful overview of the Blakely decision and
its aftermath.

å
BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION EDUCATIONAL
MATERIALS
MARGARET FISHER, JUDGES IN THE
CLASSROOM: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
(2004).
Available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/
education/lessons/BrownvBoard.doc
Many commemorations have been held
in connection with the 50th anniversary
of the decision in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For any
judge who might have an opportunity to
make a presentation to a school group,
Margaret Fisher of the Washington State
Administrative Office of the Courts has
put together an excellent set of teaching
materials on the case.
The materials are designed for a onehour class to a high-school group.
Students are given roles to get them
involved and work through the facts of
the case in some detail. They are given a
good background of the racial segregation
prevalent as of the 1950s and of the available options for dealing with it.
Suggestions are made for judges to conclude with comments regarding the role of
the courts in handling the case.

y
JUDICIAL ETHICS
ABA Joint Commission to Evaluate the
Code of Judicial Conduct
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/
drafts.html
The ABA Joint Commission to
Evaluate the Code of Judicial Conduct is
now seeking comments on its draft proposals of new provisions for Canons 3 and
4. Comments were previously sought on
Canons 1 and 2. (See Resource Page,
Summer 2003.)
You can review the proposals—and a
redlined version showing the changes—at
the web address listed above. Comments
and suggestions regarding the proposed
changes to Canons 3 and 4 may be sent
until October 8, 2004 to Eileen Gallagher
at gallaghe@staff.abanet.org or by mail to
her attention at the American Bar
Association, 321 North Clark Street,
Chicago, Illinois 60610.
Proposed changes to Canons 3 and 4
include:
• Adding “ethnicity” and “sexual orientation” to the list of factors that must not
be the basis for discrimination in the
policies of groups to which judges may
belong.
• Limiting a judge’s use of judicial letterhead to write a letter of recommendation to situations in which the judge’s
statements are based upon “information
obtained through the judge’s expertise
or experience as a judge.”
• Providing examples of when appearances by judges before various governmental bodies are permissible.
• Allowing a judge to speak, be recognized, or honored at an event sponsored
by a variety of law-related entities—
even when the event raises funds for its
sponsor.
• Providing that a judge shall not disclose
or use nonpublic information acquired
as a judge for any purpose unrelated to
their judicial duties.

